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Eggshell Economics: A Revolutionary Approach to 
the Eggshell Plaintiff Rule 
STEVE P. CALANDRILLO* & DUSTIN E. BUEHLER† 
For more than a century, courts have universally applied the eggshell plaintiff 
rule, which holds tortfeasors liable for the full extent of the harm inflicted on 
vulnerable “eggshell” victims. Liability attaches even when the victim’s 
condition and the scope of her injuries were completely unforeseeable ex ante. 
This Article explores the implications of this rule by providing a pioneering 
economic analysis of eggshell liability. It argues that the eggshell plaintiff rule 
misaligns parties’ incentives in a socially undesirable way. The rule subjects 
injurers to unfair surprise, fails to incentivize socially optimal behavior when 
injurers have imperfect information about expected accident losses, and fails 
to account for risk aversion, moral hazard, and judgment-proof problems. 
Additionally, the eggshell plaintiff rule dulls victims’ incentives to take care 
and to self-protect. 
To solve these problems, this Article proposes a revolutionary approach to 
eggshell liability: courts should reject the eggshell plaintiff rule and replace it 
with a foreseeability rule. Under this approach, tortfeasors would be liable 
only for the reasonably foreseeable scope of victims’ injuries. Insurance 
markets would then step in to compensate eggshell victims for unforeseeable 
losses, thereby preserving the compensatory role served by the traditional 
eggshell plaintiff rule without compromising optimal behavioral incentives for 
injurers and victims. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A customer slips and falls in a store, suffering an unusually rare and severe 
fracture of his femur.1 He sues the store for negligence.2 Although the store 
admits its negligence, it argues it should not be liable for the unusual and 
                                                                                                                       
 1 The following factual scenario is based loosely on Gresham v. Petro Stopping 
Centers, LP, No. 3:09-cv-00034-RCJ-VPC, 2011 WL 1748569, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 25, 
2011). 
 2 Slip-and-fall incidents are remarkably common, leading to thousands of lawsuits 
each year. See Protecting Ourselves from Slips, Trips and Falls, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, 
http://www.nsc.org/safety_home/Resources/Pages/Falls.aspx (last visited Aug. 1, 2012) 
(noting that in 2007 alone, “more than 21,700 Americans died as a result of falls and more 
than 7.9 million were injured by a fall”). 
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unforeseeable scope of the injury.3 To support its argument, the store introduces 
evidence suggesting that the customer could have done more to prevent the 
severity of his injuries.4 The evidence shows that a treatable disease has 
dramatically weakened his bones for more than a decade,5 in part because he 
never bothered to seek diagnosis.6 The court rejects this argument out of hand, 
however, simply noting that “defendants take plaintiffs as they find them.”7  
In doing so, the court relies on the eggshell plaintiff rule, “[t]he principle 
that a defendant is liable for a plaintiff’s unforeseeable and uncommon reactions 
to the defendant’s negligent or intentional act.”8 Under the rule, a defendant at 
fault is liable for the full extent of plaintiff’s injuries, even if the plaintiff 
possesses preexisting conditions that dramatically worsen the harm.9 Most 
alarmingly, liability attaches even when the plaintiff’s vulnerable condition and 
the scope of the resulting injuries were completely unforeseeable.10 The 
practical consequence is that a defendant can be on the hook for extraordinary 
damages arising from relatively ordinary conduct.11  
This makes the eggshell plaintiff rule an odd duck in modern tort law. 
During the last century, the common law of torts moved away from rigid strict 
liability rules, toward malleable notions of foreseeability.12 And yet courts left 
the eggshell plaintiff rule’s sharp edges and harsh consequences “virtually 
                                                                                                                       
 3 See, e.g., Glamann v. Kirk, 29 P.3d 255, 258 (Alaska 2001); see also Gresham, 2011 
WL 1748569, at *4 (noting that defendant seeks to introduce evidence of plaintiff’s 
preexisting condition). 
 4 See Gresham, 2011 WL 1748569, at *3–4. 
 5 See Health Guide: Osteoporosis, N.Y. TIMES, http://health.nytimes.com/ 
health/guides/disease/osteoporosis/overview.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2012) (“Osteoporosis 
is a disease in which bones become fragile and more likely to fracture. Usually the bone 
loses density, which measures the amount of calcium and minerals in the bone.”). 
 6 See id. (discussing diagnosis and treatment methods for osteoporosis). 
 7 Vidrine v. Sentry Indem. Co., 341 So. 2d 558, 563 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Shia v. 
Chvasta, 377 S.E.2d 644, 648 (W. Va. 1988). 
 8 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 593 (9th ed. 2009). Alternatively, courts and scholars call 
this the “eggshell-skull rule,” the “thin-skull rule,” the “special-sensitivity rule,” or the “old-
soldier’s rule.” Id. 
 9 See Bruneau v. Quick, 447 A.2d 742, 750–51 (Conn. 1982); McCahill v. N.Y. 
Transp. Co., 94 N.E. 616, 617–18 (N.Y. 1911); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 461 
(1965). 
 10 E.g., Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2002); Brackett 
v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78, 81 (7th Cir. 1993); Schafer v. Hoffman, 831 P.2d 897, 900 (Colo. 
1992); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 291 
(5th ed., Lawyer’s ed. 1984). 
 11 See, e.g., Bartolone v. Jeckovich, 481 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546–47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) 
(finding a driver in a “minor” car accident liable for $500,000 because the other driver’s 
“relatively minor . . . whiplash” turned into a debilitating mental disorder). 
 12 Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for 
Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 989 (2001); see also Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. 
Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99–101 (N.Y. 1928). 
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untouched.”13 The rule is a doctrinal dinosaur—“one of the few unchanged 
surviving elements of our ancient legal heritage.”14 
Perhaps the eggshell plaintiff rule has survived because it comports with 
tort law’s general goal of compensating victims for their injuries.15 To some 
extent, the rule appeals to our sense of justice because it shifts the burden of 
accident costs from victims to tortfeasors.16 And some scholars argue that 
eggshell liability is essential for tort law’s deterrence function—if courts were 
to impose liability only for the foreseeable extent of harm, tortfeasors would not 
internalize the full cost of their actions and would have diluted incentives to 
take care and prevent injuries.17 
Whatever the rationale, the eggshell plaintiff rule is universally accepted 
and widely applied.18 All American jurisdictions award eggshell damages.19 
Hundreds of judicial opinions have relied on the eggshell plaintiff rule during 
the last decade alone.20 Indeed, the rule is so well established that scholars have 
largely ignored it.21 Everyone apparently accepts the wisdom of the eggshell 
plaintiff rule, as well as its role in American tort law. 
Everyone, that is, except us. Instead of taking the traditional arguments at 
face value, this Article explores the true effects of eggshell liability by 
                                                                                                                       
 13 Gary L. Bahr & Bruce N. Graham, The Thin Skull Plaintiff Concept: Evasive or 
Persuasive, 15 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 409, 418 (1982). 
 14 Id. at 410. 
 15 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, at 6. 
 16 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 524 (7th ed. 2000); see 
also William J. Harte, Note, Liability for the Aggravation of a Pre-Existing Condition: 
Including the Allergy Factor, 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 224, 224 (1958) (“One of weak 
physical structure has as much right to protection from bodily harm as a robust athlete.”); 
Anna I. Shinkle, Note, Taking the Plaintiff as You Find Him, 16 DRAKE L. REV. 49, 50 
(1966) (noting that in eggshell cases, justice is better served if the consequences of the 
eggshell injury fall upon the negligent defendant rather than the innocent plaintiff). 
 17 See VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 422–28 
(4th ed. 2009); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
TORT LAW 250 (1987). 
 18 See McAllister Towing of Va., Inc. v. United States, No. 2:10cv595, 2012 WL 
1438770, at *26 (E.D. Va. Apr. 25, 2012) (citing the “universally accepted” eggshell 
plaintiff rule); accord In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 724 (1964). 
 19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 31 
cmt. b, reporters’ note (2005) (“Every United States jurisdiction adheres to the thin-skull 
rule; more precisely, extensive research has failed to identify a single United States case 
disavowing the rule.”). 
 20 The following search, run through Westlaw’s All State and Federal Cases database, 
yielded 233 cases: “thin skull” “eggshell skull” “eggshell plaintiff” (“defendant takes” /5 
(plaintiff victim) /5 finds /5 (him her them)) & da(aft 7/1/2002 & bef 7/1/2012) (query last 
performed Aug. 1, 2012). 
 21 See Bahr & Graham, supra note 13, at 410 (“Tucked neatly away in a crevice of 
Prosser’s Mount Proximate Cause, the thin skull principle has been interred by decades of 
dogmatic legal apathy.”). 
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providing a pioneering economic analysis of the eggshell plaintiff rule.22 In 
particular, the Article uses economic theory to determine whether the rule 
provides proper incentives for parties to take optimal actions ex ante that reduce 
accident losses and social costs.23 
We argue that the eggshell plaintiff rule significantly misaligns parties’ 
incentives in a socially undesirable way. The rule subjects injurers to unfair 
surprise, fails to incentivize socially optimal behavior when injurers have 
imperfect information about expected accident losses, and fails to account for 
the effects of risk aversion, moral hazard, and judgment-proof problems. 
Additionally, by offering compensation for the full extent of injuries, the 
eggshell plaintiff rule dulls victims’ incentives to take care and self-protect 
against losses. 
To better align the incentives of injurers and victims alike, this Article 
proposes a revolutionary approach: courts should reject the eggshell plaintiff 
rule and replace it with a foreseeability rule. Under this approach, injurers 
would not be liable for the unusual or unforeseeable extent of harm suffered by 
vulnerable victims. Instead, insurance markets would compensate eggshell 
plaintiffs for unforeseeable losses. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II briefly examines the 
development of the eggshell plaintiff rule, from its origins in nineteenth-century 
case law to the current debate over the rule’s proper application. This Part 
shows that the eggshell plaintiff rule subjects tortfeasors to potentially limitless 
liability, as long as the tortfeasor was at fault and her actions were a cause in 
fact of the eggshell victim’s injuries. 
Part III provides an unprecedented economic analysis of the eggshell 
plaintiff rule. It argues that eggshell liability misaligns the behavioral incentives 
of both injurers and victims. Generally, injurers are ignorant of the true extent 
of liability and misestimate expected damages, leading them to exercise sub-
optimal levels of care and activity. To the extent that risk-averse injurers are 
aware of the eggshell plaintiff rule, the possibility of exorbitant liability for 
unforeseeable consequences induces them to exercise too much care and engage 
in too little activity. Moreover, because victims receive full compensation under 
the eggshell plaintiff rule, they have no incentive to discover their 
vulnerabilities and self-protect. 
Finally, Part IV outlines our proposal for a foreseeability-based approach to 
eggshell liability. Tortfeasors would be liable only for the reasonably 
                                                                                                                       
 22 Economic analysis of the eggshell plaintiff rule is virtually nonexistent, consisting of 
no more than a few fleeting references. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF LAW 238–39 (8th ed. 2011) (briefly mentioning eggshell liability); STEVEN SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 236–37 (2004) (same). 
 23 Economic analysis of the law involves “application of economic theory and 
econometric methods to examine the formation, structure, processes, and impact of law and 
legal institutions.” Charles K. Rowley, Public Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, in 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 123, 125 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989). 
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foreseeable extent of victims’ injuries, regardless of whether they injure an 
eggshell victim, a “normal” victim, or an unusually resilient “steel skull” 
victim. Although the tort system would no longer compensate eggshell victims 
for the full extent of their injuries, private or social insurance would serve this 
purpose. Ultimately, a foreseeability approach would enhance certainty, 
incentivize injurers to behave optimally, and encourage eggshell victims to self-
protect and insure themselves against risk.  
II. EVOLUTION OF THE EGGSHELL PLAINTIFF RULE 
The eggshell plaintiff rule originated in nineteenth-century case law, when 
American and English courts began imposing liability on defendants for the full 
extent of damages caused to physically vulnerable plaintiffs.24 Initially, courts 
limited the rule to cases involving victims whose preexisting conditions were 
purely physical.25 Over time, many courts extended application of the eggshell 
plaintiff rule to cases involving mental harm and economic injury.26 
Considerable debate regarding the scope of the rule continues today, despite its 
universal acceptance in American jurisdictions and its entrenchment in state 
common law.27 
A. Historical Origins of the Rule 
The eggshell plaintiff rule was born in concept, if not in name, in 1891. 
That year, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided the seminal case of Vosburg v. 
Putney.28 In a common childhood altercation, twelve-year-old George Putney 
kicked fourteen-year-old Andrew Vosburg in the shin in a classroom in 
Waukesha, Wisconsin.29 Unbeknownst to Putney, Vosburg had injured his leg 
the month before in a sledding accident.30 The kick aggravated the previous 
                                                                                                                       
 24 See infra Part II.A. 
 25 See infra Part II.B. 
 26 See infra Part II.C. 
 27 See infra Part II.D. 
 28 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891). Vosburg has somewhat of a cult following among law 
professors—the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s two-page opinion has spawned hundreds of 
pages of analysis in law reviews. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Vosburg Comes 
First, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 853, 853; Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Cyberbullies Beware: Reconsidering 
Vosburg v. Putney in the Internet Age, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 379, 379 (2011); Robert L. 
Rabin, Vosburg v. Putney in Three-Part Disharmony, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 863, 863; Marshall 
S. Shapo, Knowing Foul from Fair: Vosburg, Garratt and One Long Fly Ball, 37 WASHBURN 
L.J. 243, 243 (1998); Zigurds L. Zile, Vosburg v. Putney: A Centennial Story, 1992 WIS. L. 
REV. 877, 877. 
 29 Vosburg, 50 N.W. at 403; see also Zile, supra note 28, at 883–85 (providing a 
detailed account of the circumstances surrounding Putney’s infamous kick). 
 30 See Vosburg, 50 N.W. at 403; Zile, supra note 28, at 880–81. 
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injury and eventually led to Vosburg’s permanent incapacitation.31 The court 
found Putney liable for all damages arising as a result of the kick, even though 
he did not intend the harm, nor was he aware of Vosburg’s previous injury.32 
According to the court, “the wrongdoer is liable for all the injuries resulting 
directly from the wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been 
foreseen by him.”33 
Other courts began adopting similar rules.34 For example, in a Minnesota 
case decided eight years after Vosburg,35 a salesman sprained his ankle while 
exiting a train, developed inflammatory rheumatism because of the sprain, and 
died from inflammation of the heart.36 The court concluded that plaintiff’s 
predisposition to rheumatism was immaterial and held the defendant liable 
“even though he could not have foreseen the particular results which did in fact 
follow.”37 
The term “thin skull” plaintiff finally emerged in 1901, when an English 
court decided Dulieu v. White & Sons.38 In Dulieu, a negligently driven horse 
van crashed into a pub.39 A pregnant woman working behind the bar suffered 
severe shock as a result of the crash, became seriously ill, and gave premature 
                                                                                                                       
 31 The Waukesha Freeman reported at the time that “Vosburg was confined to his bed 
for a long time, is now unable to go without crutches, and will probably be a cripple for 
life.” Zile, supra note 28, at 903 (quoting Still A-Troubling, WAUKESHA FREEMAN, Oct. 24, 
1889, at 1). 
 32 Vosburg, 50 N.W. at 403. The context of Putney’s kick may have influenced the 
court’s conclusion on liability. The court suggested that it might not have held Putney liable 
had he kicked Vosburg “upon the play-grounds of the school” while “engaged in the usual 
boyish sports,” instead of doing so after class “had been called to order by the teacher, and 
after the regular exercises of the school had commenced.” Id. 
 33 Id. at 404. 
 34 See, e.g., Montgomery & E. Ry. Co. v. Mallette, 9 So. 363, 366 (Ala. 1891) (holding 
the defendant liable for aggravating plaintiff’s prior injury); Freeman v. Mercantile Mut. 
Accident Ass’n, 30 N.E. 1013, 1014 (Mass. 1892) (“An injury which might naturally 
produce death in a person of a certain temperament or state of health is the cause of his 
death, if he dies by reason of it, even if he would not have died if his temperament or 
previous health had been different.”); Hawkins v. Front St.-Cable Ry. Co., 28 P. 1021, 1024 
(Wash. 1892) (allowing a plaintiff to recover when defendant’s negligence caused her child 
to be stillborn, despite evidence of “insufficient nourishment”), overruled on other grounds 
by Brown v. Brown, 675 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Wash. 1984). 
 35 Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co., 78 N.W. 965, 965 (Minn. 1899). 
 36 Id. at 965. 
 37 Id.; see also Spade v. Lynn & Bos. R.R., 52 N.E. 747, 748 (Mass. 1899) (holding 
that “if the defendant’s servant did commit an unjustifiable battery on the plaintiff’s person, 
the defendant must answer for the actual consequences of that wrong to her as she was, and 
cannot cut down her damages by showing that the effect would have been less upon a 
normal person”). 
 38 [1901] 2 K.B. 669 at 679 (Eng.).  
 39 Id. 
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birth.40 The court awarded the woman damages, reasoning that it is “no answer 
to the sufferer’s claim for damages that he would have suffered less injury or no 
injury at all, if he had not had an unusually thin skull or an unusually weak 
heart.”41 
B. Development of the Doctrine 
The eggshell plaintiff rule soon developed into a doctrine used by courts to 
award damages in cases involving a variety of preexisting physical conditions. 
As Jacob Stein notes, these cases generally fall into four categories.42 First, 
courts apply the rule when defendants unearth a latent condition ailing 
plaintiffs.43 For example, in Reed v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,44 the plaintiff 
was injured when his truck hit an exposed replacement rail as he crossed the 
defendant’s train tracks, aggravating an unknown, preexisting degenerative disk 
condition.45 A federal appellate court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a 
jury instruction on the eggshell plaintiff rule; the fact that his condition was 
previously unknown was of no consequence.46 
Second, the rule applies when a defendant’s negligence re-activates a 
plaintiff’s preexisting condition that had subsided due to treatment.47 In 
Bruneau v. Quick,48 the defendant performed an operation on the plaintiff’s 
feet, which worsened an existing foot condition that the plaintiff had struggled 
with her entire life.49 The defendant argued that his actions did not aggravate an 
unknown preexisting condition.50 The court nonetheless concluded that 
application of the eggshell plaintiff rule was appropriate and held the defendant 
                                                                                                                       
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 679. 
 42 See JACOB A. STEIN, 2 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 11:1 (3d ed.). 
 43 Id. (“An illustration of this principle is a case involving a plaintiff with diabetes, who 
is apparently in good health prior to the defendant’s conduct.”); see, e.g., Stoleson v. United 
States, 708 F.2d 1217, 1221 (7th Cir. 1983); Owen v. Dix, 196 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Ark. 
1946); Intermill v. Heumesser, 391 P.2d 684, 687 (Colo. 1964); Knoblock v. Morris, 220 
P.2d 171, 174 (Kan. 1950); Royer v. Eskovitz, 100 N.W.2d 306, 308 (Mich. 1960); Nelson 
v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 58 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Minn. 1953); Watford v. Morse, 118 
S.E.2d 681, 683 (Va. 1961); Reeder v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 250 P.2d 518, 522 (Wash. 
1952). 
 44 185 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 1999).  
 45 Id. at 714.  
 46 Id. at 716–17. 
 47 STEIN, supra note 42, § 11:1; see, e.g., Wise v. Carter, 119 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1960); Dzurik v. Tamura, 359 P.2d 164, 165 (Haw. 1960); Walters v. Smith, 158 
A.2d 619, 621 (Md. 1960); Rawson v. Bradshaw, 480 A.2d 37, 41 (N.H. 1984); Watson v. 
Wilkinson Trucking Co., 136 S.E.2d 286, 291 (S.C. 1964); Cobb v. Waddell, 369 S.W.2d 
743, 746 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963). 
 48 447 A.2d 742 (Conn. 1982). 
 49 Id. at 744–45. 
 50 Id. at 750. 
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liable for injuries that were “different in degree” because of plaintiff’s 
condition.51 
The third eggshell plaintiff category imposes liability on defendants if their 
actions aggravate known, preexisting conditions that have not yet received 
medical attention.52 For example, in Glamann v. Kirk,53 the defendant’s car 
rear-ended the plaintiff’s truck, resulting in severe headaches from whiplash and 
cervical spine injuries.54 The defendant argued that she should not be liable for 
the extent of the injuries, on the theory that plaintiff’s headaches had been 
caused in part by a fractured jaw from a prior car accident.55 The Alaska 
Supreme Court rejected the argument and held defendant liable for the full 
extent of plaintiff’s injuries.56 
Finally, the eggshell plaintiff rule applies when a tortfeasor accelerates an 
inevitable disability or loss of life due to a condition possessed by the plaintiff, 
even when the injury would have eventually occurred in the absence of 
defendant’s negligent conduct.57 McCahill v. New York Transportation Co.58 
provides a representative example of this category of eggshell plaintiff cases. In 
that case, one of the defendant’s employees negligently drove a taxi and struck 
the plaintiff, who suffered from alcoholism.59 After sustaining various broken 
bones, the plaintiff died in the hospital from a condition associated with 
alcoholism.60 The court affirmed an award of additional damages even though 
plaintiff’s alcoholism likely would have eventually resulted in his premature 
death.61 
In addition to these four categories, a few other features of the eggshell 
plaintiff rule bear mentioning. First, the rule extends to injuries that do not 
                                                                                                                       
 51 Id. at 751. 
 52 STEIN, supra note 42, § 11:1 (“For example, a patient who has been found to have an 
active case of diabetes can be treated with insulin. However, an injury may make the disease 
materially more difficult to control or may result in complications. Such a result is properly 
described as an aggravation of the preexisting condition.”); see, e.g., Maurer v. United 
States, 668 F.2d 98, 99–100 (2d Cir. 1981); Pozzie v. Mike Smith, Inc., 337 N.E.2d 450, 453 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1975); Reed v. Harvey, 110 N.W.2d 442, 448 (Iowa 1961); Louisville Taxicab 
& Transfer Co. v. Hill, 201 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Ky. 1947); Gallardo v. New Orleans 
Steamboat Co., 459 So. 2d 1215, 1217 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Gregory v. Shannon, 367 P.2d 
152, 154 (Wash. 1961). 
 53 29 P.3d 255, 261 (Alaska 2001). 
 54 Id. at 257–58. 
 55 Id. at 258. 
 56 Id. at 261. 
 57 STEIN, supra note 42, § 11:1; see, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 328 F.2d 502, 
504 (5th Cir. 1964); Holman v. T.I.M.E. Freight, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 462, 469 (W.D. Ark. 
1964); Bemenderfer v. Williams, 745 N.E.2d 212, 218 (Ind. 2001); Hebenstreit v. Atchison 
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 336 P.2d 1057, 1061 (N.M. 1959). 
 58 94 N.E. 616, 617–18 (N.Y. 1911). 
 59 Id. at 617. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 618. 
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immediately manifest themselves at the time of the defendant’s tortious 
action.62 Second, the defendant must be at fault for the eggshell plaintiff rule to 
apply—in order to trigger the rule, the court must first conclude that the 
defendant breached a duty, and the breach caused the plaintiff’s harm.63 Third, 
the rule imposes liability even when plaintiffs possess vulnerabilities of their 
own making.64 
Some scholars view the eggshell plaintiff rule “as an extension of the 
foreseeability test, which does not require the extent of the injury to be 
foreseeable, only the type.”65 Others view eggshell liability as an outright 
exception to rules requiring foreseeability.66 Indeed, “courts are usually candid 
in recognizing that unforeseen personal injuries are not subject to the general 
proximate cause rule that harm be foreseeable.”67 
                                                                                                                       
 62 For example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has allowed recovery for a 
plaintiff who developed injuries three months after the defendant’s negligent acts. Lockwood 
v. McCaskill, 138 S.E.2d 541, 546–47 (N.C. 1964). 
 63 DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 222 (3d ed. 1997). 
 64 In Thompson v. Lupone, for instance, an obese plaintiff suffered first-degree burns 
when a waitress negligently spilled hot coffee on her. 62 A.2d 861, 862 (Conn. 1948). The 
plaintiff also slammed her knee against the counter in reaction to her burns. Id. The 
plaintiff’s knee injury failed to improve in part because of her obesity, yet she still received 
compensation. Id. at 862–63. The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the award by reciting 
the familiar eggshell plaintiff refrain: injurers must take victims as they find them. Id. at 863. 
 65 JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 221 (2000); see also EMERGING 
ISSUES IN TORT LAW 126 (Jason W. Neyers et al. eds., 2007) (noting that the question of 
what is foreseeable “is usually framed in terms of whether the damage that has occurred was 
of the same type as the damage that was foreseeable”; as long as “the type or kind of damage 
could have been foreseen, it does not matter that its extent or the precise manner of its 
occurrence could not have been foreseen”); DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON TORTS 180 (3d ed. 2004) (distinguishing between type and extent of harm 
and noting that in eggshell cases, the defendant will be liable “if some injury of the general 
type plaintiff sustained was a foreseeable consequence of defendant’s negligent conduct, 
although the extent of the injuries may be quite unexpected” (emphasis added)).  
 66 JOHN L. DIAMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 269–70 (2d ed. 2008).  
 67 Id. at 270; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, at 292 (noting that there have been 
“a considerable number of more or less unclassifiable cases of what can only be described as 
freak accidents of a preposterous character, in which the fact that the defendant could not 
possibly have foreseen the harm to the plaintiff has been held to be no bar to recovery”); P. 
J. Rowe, The Demise of the Thin Skull Rule?, 40 MOD. L. REV. 377, 387 (1977) (suggesting 
that the “unwillingness of many judges, especially in personal injury cases, to particulari[z]e 
the damage but to look at it ‘broadly’ is an indication of a desire to compensate the injured 
without becoming over-involved in distinctions between different kinds or types of injury”). 
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C. Eggshell Extensions: Mental Harm and Economic Injury 
In recent decades, courts have extended the eggshell plaintiff rule to 
psychological harms68 and economic injuries.69 When it comes to psychological 
harm, plaintiffs in most jurisdictions may now invoke the eggshell plaintiff rule 
to recover for physical and emotional harms resulting from preexisting 
psychological conditions.70 For instance, in Bonner v. United States,71 the court 
held the defendant liable for emotional injuries resulting from a car accident.72 
In that case, the plaintiff became permanently disabled months after the initial 
accident.73 The treating physician found that the accident set in motion a series 
of events leading to psychiatric illness.74 After concluding that the accident was 
a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s mental illness, the court held the defendant 
liable for this psychological harm.75  
Courts have also employed the eggshell plaintiff rule to impose liability for 
economic harm resulting from unforeseen or unknowable damage to property.76 
                                                                                                                       
 68 See, e.g., Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 780 (5th Cir. 2000); Jenson v. Eveleth 
Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1294–95 (8th Cir. 1997); Wakefield v. NLRB, 779 F.2d 1437, 
1438 (9th Cir. 1986); McBroom v. Iowa, 226 N.W.2d 41, 45–46 (Iowa 1975); Thames v. 
Zerangue, 411 So. 2d 17, 19–20 (La. 1982); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059, 1064 & 
n.5 (Mass. 1978). But see Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 1991) (refusing to 
extend the eggshell plaintiff rule to preexisting mental conditions). 
 69 See, e.g., Martin v. Cnty. of L.A., No. B142528, 2002 WL 31117056, at *8 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Sept. 25, 2002); Colonial Inn Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Gay, 680 N.E.2d 407, 416 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1997); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 31 cmt. d (2005) (noting that the eggshell plaintiff rule “is applicable to property, as 
well”); Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1425, 1491 (2003) (noting that, under the eggshell plaintiff rule, “the defendant must 
take the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s property as the defendant finds them”). But see Rowe, 
supra note 67, at 381 (“The thin skull rule is said not to apply to damage to property, 
although authority is sparse.”). 
 70 See AARON D. TWERSKI & JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., TORTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 258 (2d ed. 2008). See generally Candice E. Renka, Note, The Presumed 
Eggshell Plaintiff Rule: Determining Liability When Mental Harm Accompanies Physical 
Injury, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 289 (2007). Courts also have held tortfeasors liable for 
aggravation of emotional distress brought about by negligent third-party treatment of an 
injury. See, e.g., Stoleson v. United States, 708 F.2d 1217, 1221 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing 
Butzow v. Wausau Mem’l Hosp., 187 N.W.2d 349, 352–53 (Wis. 1971); Heims v. Hanke, 
93 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Wis. 1958). 
 71 339 F. Supp. 640 (E.D. La. 1972). 
 72 Id. at 641, 650. 
 73 Id. at 646. 
 74 Id. at 647. 
 75 Id. at 650. 
 76 This extension of the eggshell plaintiff rule seems to be conceptually rooted in the 
classic English tort law case, In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560 
(Eng.). See TWERSKI & HENDERSON, supra note 70, at 260 (noting the similarities between 
the Polemis case and eggshell plaintiff cases). In Polemis, one of the defendant’s servants 
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For example, in Colonial Inn Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co.,77 a 
slow-moving car backed into a hotel’s air-conditioning unit, ruptured a gas line, 
and caused an explosion that damaged the building.78 The hotel owner sued the 
motorist to recover for the resulting property damage.79 The defendant argued 
“the explosion was too bizarre to be a natural and probable consequence of 
slowly backing a car into the building.”80 The court rejected this argument, 
holding that liability extends to unforeseeable harms as long as the defendant’s 
negligence caused the injury in fact.81 It based its ruling on the eggshell plaintiff 
rule, even though “the evidence suggests that a building rather than a person 
may have had an ‘eggshell skull.’”82 
D. Current Debate 
Expansion of the eggshell plaintiff rule has not been without controversy. 
Most notably, debate continues today over the rule’s application to mental or 
psychological harm. J. Stanley McQuade argues in favor of this application,83 
criticizing proposals to limit recovery to mental harms that an ordinary person 
would sustain, or harms “reactivat[ed]” or “exacerbat[ed]” when tortfeasors 
have prior notice of a plaintiff’s eggshell status.84 Because psychological 
trauma is almost always the result of a “prior predisposing condition[],” 
McQuade argues that courts should treat mental harms the same way that they 
treat preexisting physical conditions.85 
                                                                                                                       
dropped a wooden plank on a ship’s hold, which happened to contain cans of benzene that 
were leaking flammable vapors. In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. at 
562–63. The plank caused a spark that ignited the vapors and destroyed the ship. Id. The 
court held that plaintiffs were entitled to full judgment, and reasoned that the fact that the 
resulting damage was “not the exact kind of damage one would expect is immaterial, so long 
as the damage is in fact directly traceable to the negligent act.” Id. at 577. In other words, 
“[o]nce the act is negligent, the fact that its exact operation was not foreseen is immaterial.” 
Id. 
 77 680 N.E.2d 407 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
 78 Id. at 410–11. 
 79 Id. at 409. 
 80 Id. at 414. 
 81 Id. at 416. 
 82 Id. 
 83 See generally J. Stanley McQuade, The Eggshell Skull Rule and Related Problems in 
Recovery for Mental Harm in the Law of Torts, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1 (2001). 
 84 Id. at 6–7. 
 85 Id. at 39. But see Scott M. Eden, Note, I Am Having a Flashback . . . All the Way to 
the Bank: The Application of the “Thin Skull” Rule to Mental Injuries—Poole v. Copland, 
Inc., 24 N.C. CENT. L.J. 180, 181 (2001) (noting that “mental injury may be completely 
subjective in its diagnosis, origin, and treatment,” and that extension of the “thin skull” rule 
to these types of injuries “may create a flood of claims alleging that present outrageous 
conduct has caused a past traumatic event to resurface”). 
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Mark Levy and Saul Rosenberg disagree, and maintain that mental harm 
should not receive the same treatment as physical harms.86 They contend that an 
overbroad eggshell plaintiff rule “confuse[s] subsequence with consequence”—
assigning liability for psychological injuries simply on the basis of causation-in-
fact grossly oversimplifies the underlying causes of such injuries.87 
Using Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder88 as an example, Levy and 
Rosenberg argue that the eggshell plaintiff rule is inadequate to explain the 
“complex constellation of interdependent factors that contribute to actual, as 
well as merely alleged, mental damages.”89 They suggest that potential eggshell 
plaintiffs undergo thorough investigations of their lives prior to and after any 
injury sustained due to negligent conduct.90 Such inquiries would produce a “far 
more scientifically accurate” determination of whether the alleged harms arose 
from the defendant’s conduct or from the plaintiff’s preexisting mental 
condition.91 Levy and Rosenberg’s proposed approach resists automatic burden 
shifting and seeks to achieve a reliable method for calculating damages.92 
Another current—and controversial—debate surrounds the eggshell 
plaintiff rule’s application to religious beliefs. Some commentators argue that 
the rule should not extend to damages that result from a person’s religious 
                                                                                                                       
 86 Mark I. Levy & Saul E. Rosenberg, The “Eggshell Plaintiff” Revisited: Causation of 
Mental Damages in Civil Litigation, 27 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 204, 204 
(2003). 
 87 Id. at 205. 
 88 As Levy and Rosenberg explain:  
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) may develop 30 days or so after a person 
experiences a life-threatening event that engenders extreme feelings of helplessness, 
fear, or horror. PTSD is the only psychiatric diagnosis where causation is implied by the 
diagnosis, that is, the condition is assumed to be a reaction to the life-threatening event 
that preceded it. Consequently, it is one of the few psychiatric conditions where the 
concept of a mentally fragile plaintiff possessing particular vulnerabilities or “risk 
factors” may indeed apply. 
Id.  
 89 Id. But see Rachel V. Rose et al., Another Crack in the Thin Skull Plaintiff Rule: Why 
Women with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Who Suffer Physical Harm from Abusive 
Environments at Work or School Should Recover from Employers and Educators, 20 TEX. J. 
WOMEN & L. 165, 168 (2011) (arguing that “abusive behavior in educational and work 
environments can cause physical harm to PTSD sufferers and open the negligent actors up to 
tort law liability under the universally accepted ‘thin skull’ plaintiff rule”). 
 90 Levy & Rosenberg, supra note 86, at 205–06. 
 91 Id. at 206. 
 92 See id. In addition to causation issues, scholars also have considered the more 
fundamental question of the rule’s fairness in psychological cases. See EMERGING ISSUES IN 
TORT LAW, supra note 65, at 127 (suggesting that psychiatric harm and physical injury 
appear to be distinct forms of damages in cases where the plaintiff suffers a minor physical 
injury but has a “constitutional predisposition to psychiatric harm,” undercutting the 
rationale for applying the eggshell plaintiff rule to mental injuries). 
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convictions (e.g., a refusal to accept blood transfusions).93 Others suggest that 
religious beliefs constitute an integral component of each human being, 
analogous to preexisting mental and physical conditions.94 As such, injuries 
exacerbated by religious strictures should qualify for additional damages under 
the eggshell plaintiff rule.95 Although the debate is far from settled, courts 
considering this issue have so far refused to include religious beliefs in the 
category of preexisting conditions that trigger the eggshell plaintiff rule.96 
Most recently, discussion has focused on the eggshell plaintiff rule’s 
implications in the media age. For example, Annika Martin argues that the rule 
should be extended to victims of pro-eating disorder websites, to hold those 
websites liable for exacerbating eating disorders.97 Martin notes that other 
media tort cases have considered the psychological state of victims, and 
contends that viewers of pro-eating disorder websites are eggshell victims due 
to their psychological vulnerabilities.98 
                                                                                                                       
 93 See, e.g., Beth Linea Carlson, Comment, “Blood and Judgment”: Inconsistencies 
Between Criminal and Civil Courts When Victims Refuse Blood Transfusions, 33 STETSON 
L. REV. 1067, 1081–82 (2004) (arguing that, unlike preexisting physical or mental 
conditions, religious beliefs are based on voluntary and conscious reasoning and thus should 
not give rise to eggshell vulnerability). 
 94 See, e.g., Anne C. Loomis, Comment, Thou Shalt Take Thy Victim as Thou Findest 
Him: Religious Conviction as a Pre-existing State Not Subject to the Avoidable 
Consequences Doctrine, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 473, 493–98 (2007); Jennifer Parobek, 
Note, God v. The Mitigation of Damages Doctrine: Why Religion Should Be Considered a 
Pre-Existing Condition, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 107, 110 (2007); Jeremy Pomeroy, Note, Reason, 
Religion, and Avoidable Consequences: When Faith and the Duty to Mitigate Collide, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1111, 1152 (1992); see also Marc Ramsay, The Religious Beliefs of Tort 
Victims: Religious Thin Skulls or Failures of Mitigation?, 20 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 
399, 400 (2007) (arguing that “religious victims’ choices occur within a highly protected 
zone of personal choice” and, as a result, “constitutional commitments to religious freedom 
and equality require us to treat these choices as reasonable ones”). 
 95 See Pomeroy, supra note 94, at 1156. 
 96 See, e.g., Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 1991); Williams v. Bright, 658 
N.Y.S.2d 910, 915 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); see also TWERSKI & HENDERSON, supra note 70, 
at 259 (“While the thin skull rule encompasses most injuries flowing directly from the 
defendant’s negligent conduct, plaintiffs who suffer special injuries as a result of religious 
beliefs or past mental trauma may not take advantage of the rule.”). 
 97 Annika K. Martin, “Stick a Toothbrush Down Your Throat”: An Analysis of the 
Potential Liability of Pro-eating Disorder Websites, 14 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 151, 173–74 
(2005). According to Martin, “pro-eating disorder” websites include sections that list low 
calorie foods, and provide advice on how to avoid eating and hide an eating disorder. Id. at 
155. Additionally, the websites generally include “‘inspiring’ photographs of extremely thin 
celebrities and fashion models.” Id. at 155 n.19. 
 98 Id. at 174. Although Martin admits that it would be difficult to determine whether the 
harm resulted from a particular website or from plaintiff’s preexisting condition, she 
nonetheless concludes that defendants operating such websites could potentially be liable for 
some of the harm under the existing eggshell plaintiff rule. Id. 
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In sum, the eggshell plaintiff rule is now a universally accepted principle, 
although the rule’s exact scope remains in flux. Under the rule, defendants take 
plaintiffs as they find them and are liable for the full extent of the harm they 
cause. Liability is based on plaintiffs’ preexisting physical and mental makeup, 
not on the foreseeable extent of damages. 
III. EGGSHELL ECONOMICS: EXAMINING THE RULE’S BEHAVIORAL 
INCENTIVES 
With this background in mind, we examine the behavioral incentives of the 
eggshell plaintiff rule. We start by articulating the need for an economic 
analysis of the rule.99 Next, we outline the basic economic argument in favor of 
eggshell liability: the rule arguably preserves tort law’s deterrence function by 
tying damages to actual harm, ensuring that injurers internalize the full cost of 
their actions.100 We then critique this argument by describing the ways in which 
the eggshell plaintiff rule misaligns private and social incentives.101 Our 
discussion initially focuses on the rule’s effect on the incentives of injurers,102 
and then examines its effect on victims’ incentives.103 We conclude that the 
eggshell plaintiff rule misaligns parties’ incentives in socially undesirable ways. 
A. Revisiting the Rule: The Need for an Economic Analysis 
The American tort system serves three primary policy goals: deterrence of 
wrongful conduct, corrective justice, and victim compensation.104 Historically, 
tort law played an especially important role in making victims whole, as 
insurance markets did not develop until the late nineteenth century, and 
plaintiffs had no other means of obtaining compensation for their injuries.105 
Despite the extensive development of insurance markets in the twentieth 
century, there remains a strong belief today that one of the primary purposes of 
                                                                                                                       
 99 See infra Part III.A. 
 100 See infra Part III.B. 
 101 See infra Part III.C–D. 
 102 See infra Part III.C. 
 103 See infra Part III.D. 
 104 See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 445–47 (2006); Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort Reform 
Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and 
Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 638–39 (1988); see also SHAVELL, supra note 
22, at 268 (noting that tort law is rooted in the “classical and intuitively appealing notion of 
corrective justice, that a wrongdoer should compensate his victim”). 
 105 SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 269; see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1926 
(1991) (“Liability insurance was poorly developed in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Weak actuarial data and the regionalism of insurance markets limited opportunities to 
diversify risks.”). 
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tort law is to “restore injured parties to their original condition, insofar as the 
law can do this, by compensating them for their injury.”106 
Because the eggshell plaintiff rule exemplifies the notions of victim 
compensation and corrective justice, several scholars view the rule as 
“expressly moral.”107 And yet application of the rule can be anything but fair. 
Depending on the case, one’s sense of justice could favor a slightly negligent 
injurer who faces financial ruin if forced to fully compensate the victim for 
unforeseeable, extraordinary losses. In Bartolone v. Jeckovich,108 for example, a 
driver in a car accident was ordered to pay $500,000 because the injured 
driver’s “relatively minor” whiplash progressed into a debilitating mental 
disorder.109 Given the facts of the case, one could reasonably argue that the 
outcome was unjust. 
More than a century has passed since courts began using the eggshell 
plaintiff rule.110 Rather than continuing to assume the rule’s veracity, courts and 
scholars should critically examine the rule’s behavioral incentives. We do so 
through an economic approach, which focuses primarily on reducing risk 
through the adoption of legal rules that deter harmful conduct and provide 
incentives toward safety.111 
Economic analysis takes into account several principles that are not always 
considered by a traditional tort law analysis. Most notably, it seeks to maximize 
social welfare, defined as the sum of the benefits from a particular action, minus 
its social costs.112 Liability is set at a level that ensures that the only persons 
who engage in a particular activity are those who obtain more utility from their 
actions than the harm they cause to society.113 Under an economic approach, the 
                                                                                                                       
 106 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1–2 (12th ed. 2010). 
 107 Camille A. Nelson, Considering Tortious Racism, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 905, 
957 (2005) (explaining the theory that “the innocent plaintiff, however vulnerable or 
peculiar, should not bear the costs of the accident”); see also Dennis Klimchuk, Causation, 
Thin Skulls and Equality, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 115, 116 (1998) (arguing that “the 
principle of equality requires that we adopt the thin skull rule”). 
 108 481 N.Y.S.2d 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). 
 109 Id. at 546. 
 110 See Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891). 
 111 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 268 (noting that “if the liability system has a real 
purpose today, it must lie in the creation of incentives to reduce risk”); see also W. KIP 
VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 89–94 (1991) (arguing that tort liability should 
be imposed when there is “a failure to fully appreciate the risks that are present”). 
 112 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product 
Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1440 n.7 (2010) (summarizing the “social welfare-
maximizing” goal underlying the economic analysis of the law, with citations to several 
leading authorities). 
 113 Importantly, the economic approach recognizes that “not all injuries can or even 
should be deterred”—in other words, some activity is desirable even though it will result in 
harm as well. Dustin E. Buehler & Steve P. Calandrillo, Baseball’s Moral Hazard: Law, 
Economics, and the Designated Hitter Rule, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2083, 2096 (2010); Steve P. 
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primary goal of our liability system is the optimal alignment of private and 
social behavioral incentives—not compensation of victims per se—because 
accident insurance is widely available to accomplish the latter purpose.114 
B. The Basic Argument in Favor of the Eggshell Plaintiff Rule 
The few scholars who have briefly examined the economics of eggshell 
plaintiffs assume that the current rule properly aligns injurers’ incentives.115 
Richard Posner and Steven Shavell cite the rule in support of their general 
argument that tort damages should equal the actual harm caused by injurers.116 
By tying damages to actual harm (rather than a “foreseeable” level of harm), 
liability rules ensure that injurers fully internalize the harm they cause, 
preserving tort law’s deterrence function even when multiple levels of harm are 
possible.117  
A simple unilateral accident model illustrates the economic allure of the 
eggshell plaintiff rule as part of a damages-equal-actual-harm approach.118 
Suppose that someone owns a vicious (but beloved) dog that is prone to biting 
people.119 Assume that 90% of victims would sustain “normal” damages of 
$100 from a dog bite, and that 10% would suffer $10,000 in damages because 
                                                                                                                       
Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approach to 
Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957, 979 (2001); see also SHAVELL, 
supra note 22, at 179 (noting that “the optimal level of care may well not result in the lowest 
possible level of expected accident losses”). 
 114 See MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS 42 (1995) (“First-party health 
and/or accident insurance is now widely available to many potential victims, usually through 
the relatively efficient mechanism of group policies maintained by employers.”); see also 
Douglas H. Cook, Personal Responsibility and the Law of Torts, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1245, 
1266–68 (1996) (discussing the utilization and availability of insurance). 
 115 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 22, at 238–39; SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 236–37. 
 116 POSNER, supra note 22, at 238; SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 236–37; see also Louis 
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1333 (2001) 
(referencing the argument that “the valuations employed in measuring tort damages or in 
performing cost-benefit analysis . . . should reflect actual harm rather than victims’ 
uninformed ex ante estimates”). 
 117 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 236–37 (noting that if damages fall short of actual 
harm, incentives to reduce risk will be inadequate, and if expected damages exceed harm, 
incentives to reduce risk will be too high). This calculation also assumes “rational” actors. 
“That is, they are forward looking and behave so as to maximize their expected utility.” Id. 
at 1.  
 118 In unilateral accidents, “the actions of injurers but not of victims are assumed to 
affect the probability or severity of losses.” Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus 
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1980). In bilateral accident scenarios, “potential victims 
as well as injurers may influence the probability or magnitude of accident losses.” Id. at 6.  
 119 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 197 (describing a similar hypothetical). 
392 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 74:3 
 
they are particularly vulnerable to bites (e.g., they are unusually susceptible to 
bacterial infections, or have brittle skin or bones).120 
Suppose also that the owner’s willingness to walk her dog in less populated 
areas of the city affects the probability of dog bites. If the owner exercises no 
care and walks the dog in her heavily populated neighborhood, there is a 30% 
chance of a dog bite. Alternatively, for a cost of $10 the owner can exercise a 
moderate level of care by driving to a less dense neighborhood,121 which 
reduces the probability of a dog bite to 10%. And for a cost of $20, the owner 
can exercise a high level of care by driving to a remote area of town, reducing 
the chance of a dog bite to 5%.122 
The following table shows the expected accident losses and social costs 
associated with the levels of care described above123: 











None 0 30% 
30% x (90% x 100 
+ 10% x 10,000) 
= 327 
0 + 327  
= 327 
Moderate 10 10% 
10% x (90% x 100 
+ 10% x 10,000) 
= 109 
10 + 109 
 = 119 
High 20 5% 
5% x (90% x 100 
+ 10% x 10,000) 
= 54.5 
20 + 54.5 
 = 74.5 
 
The table illustrates that it is socially desirable for the owner to exercise a 
high level of care by driving to a remote area of town—the total social cost of 
doing so is $74.50 (the $20 cost of care plus $54.50 in expected accident losses 
to both normal and eggshell victims).124 These social costs are significantly less 
                                                                                                                       
 120 These assumptions regarding the severity of harm and the proportion of normal 
versus eggshell victims are purely hypothetical; we use them merely to illustrate one 
possible outcome under our model. Obviously policymakers should adjust these numbers to 
reflect available accident data.  
 121 The hypothetical $10 cost of care could conceivably include the cost of gas, vehicle 
depreciation, lost time, etc. 
 122 Assume for the sake of simplicity that the various probabilities of risk and costs of 
care in this model are constant. In other words, the costs of care and associated probabilities 
of dog bites are not affected by other variables, such as time of day, day of the week, 
weather, etc. 
 123 For a similar model and table illustrating the relationship between the care of injurers 
and accident risks, see SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 179. 
 124 See id. at 178 (identifying the “social goal” of an economic approach as the 
“minimization of the sum of the costs of care and of expected accident losses”). 
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than the social costs associated with no care ($327) or a moderate level of care 
($119).125 Thus, the law should incentivize the owner to exercise a high level of 
care in order to maximize social welfare.126 
Assuming that a dog owner has perfect information regarding the relevant 
costs of care and accident probabilities, the eggshell plaintiff rule will 
incentivize her to exercise an optimal level of care.127 This is true regardless of 
whether the rule is used in tandem with strict liability or negligence.128 If courts 
apply the eggshell plaintiff doctrine with strict liability rules, the owner is liable 
for all of the harm her dog causes, including any injuries to eggshell 
plaintiffs.129 The owner will internalize the full social cost of her actions and 
will exercise high care to minimize her total expected costs.130 And if courts 
instead apply the eggshell plaintiff doctrine with negligence rules, that approach 
also induces optimal behavior as long as courts set the due care standard to 
equal high care.131 If that is the case, the dog owner will exercise a high level of 
care to avoid liability altogether.132 
In addition to the eggshell plaintiff rule’s effect on the level of care, the rule 
arguably induces injurers to engage in an optimal level of activity, at least when 
strict liability applies. Generally, it is socially desirable for an individual to 
continue to engage in an activity as long as the utility he gains exceeds total 
                                                                                                                       
 125 See id. (comparing the total social costs of various levels of care). 
 126 Although in our example it is socially optimal for the injurer to exercise the highest 
possible level of care, this will not always be the case. If the marginal increase in the cost of 
care exceeds the marginal decrease in expected accident losses, it is possible (and perhaps 
likely) that the optimal level of care will be moderate, not high. See id. at 179. 
 127 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 238–39 (suggesting that the eggshell plaintiff rule 
induces socially optimal behavior); SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 229 (discussing the effect of 
parties’ misperception of risk and the level of due care). 
 128 In reality, most states have imposed some form of strict liability for dog bites, 
although the law varies by jurisdiction. See Hilary M. Schwartzberg, Note, Tort Law in 
Action and Dog Bite Liability: How the American Legal System Blocks Plaintiffs from 
Compensation, 40 CONN. L. REV. 845, 857 (2008); Rebecca F. Wisch, Quick Overview of 
Dog Bite Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CENTER (2004), http://www.animallaw.info/articles/ 
qvusdogbite.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2012). 
 129 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 226–31 (outlining the economics of strict liability); 
SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 179–80 (same). 
 130 Explained in more detail, the dog owner would exercise a high level of care under a 
strict-liability-plus-eggshell-plaintiff-rule regime because the total expected cost of $74.50 
(the $20 cost of care, plus $54.50 in expected liability resulting from accidents with 5% 
probability) is less than the total expected cost of $327 if she exercises no care, and it is also 
less than the total expected cost of $119 if she exercises a moderate level of care. 
 131 It is debatable whether courts actually set the due care standard at optimal levels. See 
SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 224–29. 
 132 See Shavell, supra note 118, at 2 (noting that “under the negligence rule all that an 
injurer needs to do to avoid the possibility of liability is to make sure to exercise due care if 
he engages in his activity”); see also POSNER, supra note 22, at 213–17; SHAVELL, supra 
note 22, at 180. 
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social costs (costs of care plus expected accident losses).133 Using the example 
described above, suppose that legal rules properly incentivize the dog owner to 
exercise an optimal level of care—each time of day she walks her dog the cost 
of care is $20, and expected accident losses are $54.50.134 Suppose also that the 
dog owner derives $100 in utility the first time each day she walks her dog, $50 
in utility the second time she walks her dog, and only $30 in utility the third 
time she walks her dog.135 
The following table shows the utility and total social costs associated with 
the levels of activity described above136: 










Total Cost Utility Minus Cost 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 100 20 54.5 20 + 54.5  = 74.5 
100 – 74.5 
 = 25.5 
2 150 40 109 40 + 109   = 149 
150 – 149  
= 1 
3 180 60 163.5 60 + 163.5 = 223.5 
180 – 223.5 
= -43.5 
 
This table illustrates that it is socially desirable for the owner to walk the 
dog only once per day because that level of activity maximizes social welfare at 
$25.50. Additional walks are socially undesirable because the increase in total 
cost exceeds the marginal increase in the dog owner’s utility.137 
                                                                                                                       
 133 SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 193; see also T. Randolph Beard et al., Tort Liability for 
Software Developers: A Law & Economics Perspective, 27 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & 
INFO. L. 199, 219 (2009) (noting that “when the level of activity is added to the model, the 
social goal is to maximize social welfare; whereas before, the goal was simply to minimize 
social cost”). 
 134 For sake of simplicity, we assume that any increase in the dog owner’s activity level 
will lead to a proportional increase in both the cost of care and expected accident losses. In 
other words, if the owner walks the dog once, the cost of care will be $20 and expected 
accident losses will be $54.50; if she walks the dog twice, the cost of care and expected 
accident losses will double to $40 and $109 respectively. 
 135 This reflects the reality that “marginal benefits diminish as the actor increases his 
activity level . . . because the actor gains less in utility from an additional unit of the activity 
as his activity level expands.” Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Public Nuisance Law and 
the New Enforcement Actions, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 49 n.8 (2010). 
 136 For a similar model illustrating the relationship between activity levels, accident 
losses, and social welfare, see SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 194–97. 
 137 See id. (comparing the total social costs of various levels of activity). 
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From an economic standpoint, the eggshell plaintiff rule ensures optimal 
levels of activity by forcing injurers to internalize the full cost of accident losses 
(including losses suffered by vulnerable victims).138 Expected accident losses in 
Table 2 include damages to eggshell dog-bite victims; thus, the dog owner 
internalizes the full extent of harm caused by her activity. She will walk her dog 
exactly once per day, which is socially optimal. 
Note, however, that legal rules will induce a socially optimal level of 
activity only in the context of strict liability.139 If negligence law applies 
instead, exercise of due care will absolve the injurer from liability for accident 
losses, and as a result the injurer will keep engaging in the activity as long as 
the marginal increase in her utility exceeds the costs of care.140 Applied to our 
example above, if the owner takes due care each time she walks her dog, she 
will be absolved from negligence liability and will have no reason to consider 
the accident losses resulting from her actions.141 As a result, a dog owner 
subject to negligence liability will engage in a socially excessive level of 
activity—she will walk her dog three times because she gains $180 in utility for 
only $60 in care (the additional $163.50 in cost imposed on society is not her 
problem).142 The presence or absence of the eggshell plaintiff rule does not 
affect the dog owner’s behavior in this scenario because she has no reason to 
consider expected accident losses.143 
In sum, the main economic argument in support of the eggshell plaintiff 
rule is that the rule ensures that tort damages equal actual harm, incentivizing 
injurers to exercise an optimal level of care. In the context of strict liability, the 
                                                                                                                       
 138 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 238–39 (suggesting that the eggshell plaintiff rule 
induces socially optimal behavior). 
 139 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 196–99. 
 140 See id. at 196 (noting that injurers who take due care under a negligence regime 
“have no reason to consider the effect that engaging in their activity has on accident losses”); 
Beard et al., supra note 133, at 220 (“Since [negligence] liability is unaffected by the activity 
level, the injurer selects an activity level that is too high (activity continues as long as total 
utility rises more than care costs with additional activity).”). 
 141 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 196. 
 142 Perhaps courts could guard against this socially undesirable effect by factoring 
activity levels into the due care standard for negligence. For a discussion on the feasibility of 
doing so, see, for example, Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-Based Negligence and the Regulation of 
Activity Levels in Negligence Law, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 327–37 (1992) (arguing that 
courts often incorporate activity levels into the negligence inquiry); and LANDES & POSNER, 
supra note 17, at 69–71 (arguing that courts do not incorporate activity levels into 
negligence determinations, because it is costly to evaluate activity levels). 
 143 Ultimately, this reflects a defect in the negligence approach in general, rather than a 
defect in the eggshell plaintiff rule in particular. See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 198 (“The 
failing of the negligence rule results from an implicit assumption that the standard of 
behavior for determining negligence is defined only in terms of the level of care, an 
assumption that seems generally to be true in reality.” (footnote omitted)). 
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rule arguably also incentivizes injurers to engage in a socially optimal level of 
activity. 
C. Perverse Consequences from the Best of Intentions: Misalignment of 
Injurers’ Incentives 
The argument for the eggshell plaintiff rule is less persuasive when one 
considers other economic consequences of the rule, however. We argue that 
eggshell liability significantly misaligns the incentives of both injurers and 
victims. Looking first to the incentives of injurers, the eggshell plaintiff rule 
subjects injurers to unfair surprise,144 fails to incentivize socially optimal 
behavior when injurers have imperfect information about expected accident 
losses,145 and fails to account for the effects of risk aversion, moral hazard, and 
the judgment-proof problem.146 
1. Unfair Surprise: The Rule’s Stark Contrast with Contract Law 
The most problematic feature of the eggshell plaintiff rule is that it subjects 
injurers to unfair surprise.147 When the rule comes into play, injurers must fully 
compensate victims, even if the extent of the injury is unusual, bizarre, or 
perhaps completely unforeseeable.148 In such cases, holding the injurer liable 
for the full extent of the eggshell plaintiff’s unforeseeable injuries “may impose 
a ruinous liability which no private fortune could meet, and which is out of all 
proportion to the defendant’s fault.”149 
                                                                                                                       
 144 See infra Part III.C.1. 
 145 See infra Part III.C.2. 
 146 See infra Part III.C.3. 
 147 Once a court concludes that the defendant is at fault, the eggshell plaintiff rule 
applies without mercy: “the defendant does not escape liability for the unforeseeable 
personal reactions of the plaintiff.” DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 63, at 222. 
 148 See R.E.T. Corp. v. Frank Paxton Co., 329 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Iowa 1983) (“[T]ort 
damages are not limited by the reasonable contemplations of the parties. . . . [T]he amount of 
direct injury is compensated, whether its extent was contemplated or not.”); KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 10, at 291 (noting that it is “as if a magic circle were drawn about the [eggshell 
plaintiff], and one who breaks it, even by so much as a cut on the finger, becomes liable for 
all resulting harm to the person, although it may be death”). 
 149 KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, at 293 (footnote omitted). In contrast to the eggshell 
plaintiff rule’s logic, numerous decisions abound with statements to the effect that “the 
punishment should fit the crime,” and indeed often explicitly reference the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 n.24 (1996) (“The principle that 
punishment should fit the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law 
jurisprudence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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In contrast to tort law’s eggshell plaintiff rule, the avoidance of unfair 
surprise is a fundamental principle for damage assessments in contract law.150 
As every first-year law student knows, the seminal case of Hadley v. 
Baxendale151 lays out the rule that contract damages are recoverable only if they 
are foreseeable. That foreseeability may come either generally (because the loss 
arises naturally from defendants’ breach of contract) or specially (because 
“special circumstances . . . were communicated by the plaintiff[s] to the 
defendant[s], and thus known to both parties”).152 
Hadley’s rule is based on the rationale that the victim often is in a better 
position than the injurer to avoid the consequences of a breach of contract, even 
if the victim cannot prevent the breach herself.153 The victim may communicate 
her vulnerability to the breacher, thus putting the breacher on notice of the 
potential consequential damages; or the victim may take extra precautions 
herself to avoid those damages.154 
It is not immediately clear why Hadley’s rationale should not also apply in 
the context of tort injuries.155 Injurers are not on notice of the potentially 
catastrophic injuries that eggshell victims suffer from seemingly routine 
actions.156 Moreover, injurers are held liable even when victims know of their 
preexisting conditions or unusual vulnerabilities and are in a far better position 
to avoid harm.157 The current rule does not consider whether an eggshell victim 
can take extra precautions to protect herself, whether she can communicate her 
condition to others, or whether she can take other actions to notify injurers of 
her vulnerabilities.158  
                                                                                                                       
 150 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 158–59. 
 151 (1854) 26 Eng. Rep. 398 (Exch.). 
 152 Id. at 402. 
 153 POSNER, supra note 22, at 159. 
  154 The general principle excusing a party from liability for consequential damages if the 
risk of loss is known only to the other party creates incentives to allocate risk in the most 
efficient manner. This is so because if the party with knowledge of the risk is the most 
efficient preventer of the loss, he will take precautions to reduce the risk; if this party 
believes that the other party might be the most efficient preventer of loss, he will reveal the 
risk to the other party and pay him to prevent it. See id. at 158–59. But cf. Louis Wolcher, 
Price Discrimination and Inefficient Risk Allocation Under the Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 
12 RES. L. & ECON. 9, 9–26 (1989) (modeling Hadley’s rule in a less-than-competitive 
market and finding that the incentive to provide information about unforeseeable losses can 
be inefficient, because once a provider with market power knows the plaintiff’s special 
vulnerability to losses, he is in a position to extract that plaintiff’s consumer surplus). 
 155 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 158–59 (raising this issue). 
 156 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 10, at 293 (noting that it is “inconceivable that any 
defendant should be held liable to infinity for all of the consequences which flow from a 
single act”). 
 157 See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 158 For example, one of the authors recalls the first time he went skiing in California. 
Several blind skiers were enjoying the slopes while wearing bright orange vests. The blind 
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2. Imperfect Information, Levels of Care, and Levels of Activity 
Injurers also likely have imperfect information ex ante about expected 
eggshell losses, which can misalign their incentives in a socially undesirable 
way.159 The following discussion illustrates this effect by examining the 
behavioral incentives of two types of injurers: those who are entirely ignorant of 
possible eggshell damages, and those who are partially ignorant of possible 
eggshell damages. As we shall see, the eggshell plaintiff rule fails to incentivize 
optimal behavior in both situations. 
First, let us examine behavioral incentives when injurers are completely 
(and reasonably) ignorant of the harm they might cause (e.g., a student 
negligently kicks a classmate in the shin, not expecting any harm, but the kick 
shatters the classmate’s leg due to a latent brittle-bone disease).160 Because this 
“reasonable” injurer is unaware of the possibility that he is striking an eggshell 
plaintiff, he will not factor the probability and severity of eggshell damages into 
his decision calculus.161 As a result, the injurer likely will take too little care 
and engage in too much activity.162 
To illustrate this point, we revisit our model from the previous section.163 
Suppose that the owner of the vicious dog is entirely ignorant of the fact that 
10% of dog-bite victims will suffer eggshell damages of $10,000.164 Instead, the 
owner reasonably (but incorrectly) believes that all victims will suffer $100 in 
damages. The following table illustrates the effect that this incorrect belief has 
on the dog owner’s level of care: 
                                                                                                                       
skiers presumably wore these vests to notify sighted skiers around them of their condition in 
order to avoid accidents. 
 159 Cf. Robert A. Mikos, “Eggshell” Victims, Private Precautions, and the Societal 
Benefits of Shifting Crime, 105 MICH. L. REV. 307, 345–47 (2006) (discussing information 
distortions in the context of eggshell victims of crimes). 
 160 See Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891). It is worth noting that the 
same situation would result if injurers are unaware that the law holds them liable for 
eggshell damages. We do not address this “ignorance of the law” situation, because all laws 
are subject to the same critique. See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 563 (“If a person is held 
liable for violating well-appreciated laws or laws that can be learned through reasonable 
effort, he will have an incentive to learn the laws and adhere to them.”). 
 161 In an ideal world, “[a] risk-neutral party makes decisions on the basis of probability-
discounted, or expected, values.” SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 178. Inaccurate information 
obviously would affect the optimality of these decisions. 
 162 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 236–37 (noting that if damages fall short of actual 
harm, incentives to reduce risk are inadequate). 
 163 See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text. 
 164 This mirrors reality—most injurers likely are completely ignorant of the possibility 
of excessive damages for relatively rare eggshell vulnerabilities. See Tali Nachshoni & 
Moshe Kotler, Legal and Medical Aspects of Body Dysmorphic Disorder, 26 MED. & L. 721, 
731 (2007) (noting that “eggshell skulls are fortunately rare in medicine”). 
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None 0 30% 30% x (100% x 100)  = 30 
0 + 30 
= 30 
Moderate 10 10% 10% x (100% x 100)  = 10 
10 + 10  
= 20 
High 20 5% 5% x (100% x 100)  = 5 
20 + 5 
= 25 
 
Although our prior discussion demonstrated that it is socially optimal for 
the dog owner to take high care,165 Table 3 shows that when injurers are 
completely ignorant of the possibility of eggshell damages, they will exercise a 
socially inadequate level of care. Because the owner is unaware of the 
possibility that her dog might bite eggshell victims, her ex ante perception of 
expected accident losses is too low,166 and she mistakenly believes that it is in 
her interest to take moderate care, not high care.167 
Moreover, ignorance of the possibility of eggshell damages makes it likely 
that injurers will engage in socially excessive levels of activity. The following 
table illustrates the effect that the dog owner’s ignorance of eggshell victims 
would have on her level of activity, assuming that her ignorance indeed leads 
her to exercise a moderate level of care. 
  
                                                                                                                       
 165 See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text. 
 166 If the dog owner is aware that there is a 10% chance that a dog-bite victim will suffer 
$10,000 in damages and a 90% chance that a victim will suffer $100 in damages, she knows 
that the expected harm from each bite is $1,090. But if the owner instead mistakenly thinks 
that all victims will suffer $100 in damages, then she perceives that the harm from each bite 
is $100—an amount that is not even 10% of the actual expected harm. 
 167 Stated another way, if injurers are completely ignorant of the possibility of eggshell 
plaintiffs, then the eggshell plaintiff rule has no effect on injurers’ behavior. 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 100 10 10 10 + 10  = 20 
100 – 20  
= 80 
2 150 20 20 20 + 20  = 40 
150 – 40 
 = 110 
3 180 30 30 30 + 30  = 60 
180 – 60  
= 120 
 
Although our previous discussion demonstrated that it is socially optimal 
for the dog owner to walk her dog only once,168 Table 4 shows that when 
injurers are completely ignorant of the possibility of eggshell damages, they 
will engage in socially excessive levels of activity. The dog owner’s ignorance 
of the full extent of damages induces her to choose a less expensive (and 
socially inadequate) level of care and leads her to underestimate expected 
accident losses.169 This makes it more likely that the marginal increase in the 
owner’s utility from each walk exceeds her perception of the total costs.170 As a 
result, the dog owner mistakenly believes that it is in her interest to walk her 
dog three times, rather than once.171 
Second, the eggshell plaintiff rule also fails to induce optimal behavior in 
the modified unforeseeability scenario—where injurers have some knowledge 
of eggshell plaintiffs but are partially ignorant of the probability or extent of 
eggshell damages.172 This group represents the functional interpretation of 
                                                                                                                       
 168 See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
 169 If the dog owner assumes that all victims will suffer $100 in damages and is ignorant 
of the fact that 10% of victims will suffer $10,000 in damages, she will significantly 
underestimate expected accident losses—she will wrongly conclude that expected accident 
losses are only $100, instead of $1,090. Because the dog owner underestimates accident 
losses, there is a greater chance that she will conclude that a lower (and cheaper) level of 
care minimizes her losses. See supra notes 124–26, 166–67 and accompanying text. 
 170 In our example, the dog owner wrongly believes that expected accident losses 
increase by only $10 each time she walks her dog. Thus, the increases in her marginal utility 
(ranging from $100 the first time she walks her dog, to $30 the third time she walks her dog) 
will always justify additional activity. 
 171 As Table 4 illustrates, the owner mistakenly believes that her marginal utility will be 
maximized when she walks her dog for the third time (which she believes will yield $120 in 
utility-minus-costs, exceeding the net utility of $80 for one walk and $110 for two walks). 
 172 This scenario is probably the most common. Many injurers probably are aware that 
eggshell victims are out there, but they have little or no idea how likely it is that they will 
encounter an eggshell victim. See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 481 (noting that “individuals 
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existing law—in practice, “unforeseeable damages” are not damages that are 
impossible to foresee; the term actually describes damages that a reasonable 
person would fail to foresee.173 The partial-knowledge scenario will encompass 
situations in which the injurer is aware that he is on the hook for eggshell 
damages but is guessing about the probability and amount of those damages.174  
Injurers in this category likely will misestimate the expected damages from 
their activity.175 Whether injurers with partial knowledge overestimate or 
underestimate damages (and to what extent) depends on a variety of factors and 
is the subject of much scholarly debate.176 Regardless of whether injurers 
overestimate or underestimate the probability and severity of harm, their partial 
knowledge will lead them to act sub-optimally, decreasing social welfare.177 
The previous model illustrates this conclusion with respect to the 
underestimation of damages.178 One can extrapolate scenarios from that model 
                                                                                                                       
often experience difficulty in assessing and interpreting probabilities, especially small 
ones”). 
 173 JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL., TORT LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 417 (3d ed. 
2002). The term “unforeseeable damages” is therefore subject to the same limitations as the 
words “reasonable” and “foreseeable.” See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 
103 (N.Y. 1928). 
 174 See WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, 
MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 147 (2004) (examining the gap between media 
presentation of tort cases and the actual cases). 
 175 See W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 660–63 (2d. 
ed. 1997) (“[S]ituations involving risk and uncertainty are also well known for the irrational 
decisions that they may generate. . . . This pattern of overreaction and underreaction suggests 
that market decisions will seldom be optimal.”).  
 176 Compare SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 227 (“[U]ncertainty will tend to induce parties 
to take higher than desirable levels of care to guard against being found liable by mistake.”), 
and Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The 
Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 724 (2008) (“Notwithstanding 
evidence of overconfidence, people tend to overestimate the chance of ‘available’ 
risks. . . . [I]nclud[ing] recent events that have received lots of publicity.”), with Christine 
Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 
1663 (1998) (“It is difficult to come up with examples of events giving rise to individual 
liability the probability of which is likely to be overestimated rather than (as suggested 
above) underestimated.”), and Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is 
Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 671 
n.5 (1994) (“[T]here is no compelling reason to assume that their guesses would be too low 
rather than too high.”). 
 177 Of course, one could argue that the overestimations and underestimations will 
average out. But this scenario seems unlikely. And even if injurers’ misestimations do 
average out, that result is the product of chance and thus inferior to a rule that properly 
incentivizes individuals to maximize social welfare. See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-
Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 874 
(2002) (noting that “[b]ecause offsetting distortions will occur only by coincidence,” courts 
should reject a legal rule that relies on such an outcome). 
 178 See supra notes 164–71 and accompanying text. 
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in which injurers overestimate harm (i.e., injurers exercise a socially excessive 
level of care and engage in undesirably low levels of activity).179 Either way, 
imperfect information makes it likely that incentives are sub-optimal under the 
existing eggshell plaintiff rule. 
3. Risk Aversion, Moral Hazard, and Judgment-Proof Problems 
Aside from imperfect information about the probability and severity of 
accidents involving eggshell victims, other unintended consequences of the 
eggshell plaintiff rule can induce injurers to take socially undesirable actions. 
Pitfalls include and result from the reality of risk aversion, moral hazard, and 
the judgment-proof problem. 
First, risk aversion may induce injurers to exercise socially excessive levels 
of care or socially inadequate levels of activity.180 Risk-averse individuals are 
“uncomfortable with volatility or uncertainty,”181 and are unwilling to bear risk 
even in situations in which it would be actuarially fair to do so.182 Injurers tend 
to be risk averse when they engage in conduct that could result in serious injury 
and large damages awards—conduct that “would be likely to cause losses that 
                                                                                                                       
 179 As the perceived harm increases, injurers will be more likely to exercise a higher 
level of care to reduce the risk of that harm. Increases in perceived harm also make it more 
likely that perceived accident losses will exceed the utility that injurers gain from various 
levels of activity.  
An excellent real-world illustration of the fact that eggshell damages can lead injurers to 
dramatically reduce activity levels below the social optimum arises in the context of 
vaccinations. While everyone knows that routine childhood immunizations benefit 99+% of 
our population and have prevented literally millions of deaths, it is also true that a small 
minority of recipients will experience adverse effects, like allergic reactions, seizures, or 
even death in extremely rare cases. The expansion of tort liability against vaccine 
manufacturers in the 1960s and 1970s drove dozens of companies out of business, to the 
point where the medical community was concerned that essential vaccines would become 
unavailable. Congress finally acted to correct the problem in 1986, passing the National 
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. See Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are 
So Many Americans Opting out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 
408–11 (2004). This Act created an insurance pool to compensate the few victims of 
childhood immunizations, while making it far more difficult to bring tort cases, where 
lottery-like damages had been bankrupting manufacturers. Id.  
 180 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 260; see also John W. Pratt, Risk Aversion in the 
Small and the Large, 32 ECONOMETRICA 122, 122 (1964) (discussing risk aversion). But see 
Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Lowry, Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 
1644, 1644 (2002) (noting circumstances in which individuals prefer risk). 
 181 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (9th ed. 2009).  
 182 KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 90 (1974). For 
example, “[a] risk-averse person would pay to avoid a risk, such as one involving a 50 
percent chance of losing $1,000 and a 50 percent chance of winning $1,000.” SHAVELL, 
supra note 22, at 258. For these people, “losses loom larger than gains.” Daniel Kahneman 
& Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 
263, 279 (1979). 
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are significant in relation to their assets.”183 If liability insurance is unavailable, 
risk-averse injurers are forced to bear risk.184 To avoid (or reduce) this risk, 
they tend to exercise socially excessive levels of care or engage in socially 
inadequate levels of activity.185 
The eggshell plaintiff rule could induce precisely this type of behavior 
among uninsured risk-averse injurers, especially in the context of strict liability. 
The rule requires injurers to compensate eggshell victims for the full extent of 
their damages;186 thus, injurers are exposed to the possibility of large damages 
awards.187 If strict liability applies and insurance is unavailable, risk-averse 
injurers will exercise an excessive level of care and also will curb their level of 
activity.188 Note, however, that this undesirable effect among risk-averse 
injurers arguably would be limited to the context of strict liability; if negligence 
rules apply, injurers can avoid the risk of large damages awards by exercising 
due care.189 
Conversely, if liability insurance is available, injurers may exercise 
inadequate care levels or engage in socially excessive activity levels if the 
presence of insurance creates a moral hazard effect.190 Moral hazard refers to 
“the tendency for an insured party to take less care to avoid an insured loss than 
the party would have taken if the loss had not been insured, or even to act 
                                                                                                                       
 183 SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 258. In contrast, injurers tend to be risk neutral when 
faced with the prospect of liability for small losses. Id. Most persons are risk averse to some 
extent. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 
AM. ECON. REV. 941, 959 (1963) (characterizing individuals as “normally risk-averters”).  
 184 See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
603, 669 (2006); Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated 
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1265 (2004). 
 185 SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 260. 
 186 STEIN, supra note 42. 
 187 See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 534 
(2003) (noting that the eggshell plaintiff rule exposes defendants to “large damage awards 
because of a hidden vulnerability in the plaintiff”). 
 188 Specifically, because uninsured injurers would be liable for the full extent of harm 
under a strict-liability-plus-eggshell-plaintiff-rule regime, they would bear the full cost of 
harm they inflict, as well as the risk associated with large damages awards. Injurers would 
adjust both their level of care and level of activity to reduce this risk. See SHAVELL, supra 
note 22, at 260. 
 189 This of course assumes that courts can accurately assess the optimal level of care in 
various accident scenarios and that injurers are aware of that level of care—assumptions that 
are not always true. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of 
Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799, 806–13 (1983) (critiquing the “conventional theory” that 
injurers can accurately identify the due care standard set by courts). 
 190 For a discussion of moral hazard, see, for example, CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE 
RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
(1985); Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996). 
404 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 74:3 
 
intentionally to bring about that loss.”191 If insurers have difficulty observing 
whether injurers take adequate precautions, insurance premiums will not reflect 
injurers’ actual level of care and, more importantly, the exercise of care will not 
lower premiums.192 In that situation, injurers are insured against losses 
(including eggshell damages), and would have no premium-based incentive to 
take care or curb excessive activity.193 
Finally, the eggshell plaintiff rule will have little or no effect on the 
behavior of judgment-proof injurers.194 Individuals are judgment-proof when 
their assets are insufficient to pay for the accident losses they cause.195 When 
injurers are judgment proof, they view losses exceeding their assets as merely 
equaling their assets, and this in turn leads injurers to exercise inadequate levels 
of care and excessive levels of activity.196 For example, if there is a possibility 
of $100,000 in eggshell damages but the injurer only has $5,000 in assets, the 
injurer will not be concerned with the risk of losses exceeding $5,000, 
significantly diluting the incentives created by the eggshell plaintiff rule.197 
In sum, the eggshell plaintiff rule fails to incentivize socially optimal 
behavior among injurers for a variety of reasons. First, the rule subjects injurers 
to unfair surprise. Second, injurers with no knowledge of eggshell plaintiffs will 
still exercise too little care and engage in excessive levels of activity. Injurers 
with some knowledge of eggshell plaintiffs will likely misestimate expected 
damages and exercise sub-optimal care and activity levels (either too high or 
                                                                                                                       
 191 Jacob Loshin, Note, Insurance Law’s Hapless Busybody: A Case Against the 
Insurable Interest Requirement, 117 YALE L.J. 474, 506 (2007). 
 192 SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 262–63. 
 193 Id. at 263. But see Muhammad Masum Billah, Note, Economic Analysis of 
Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability, 19 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 297, 312 (2007) (noting that 
“insurers are able, by and large, to check the problem of moral hazard or under-deterrence 
through various strategies such as partial coverage, deductibles, and differentiating premium 
rates based on past loss experience”). 
 194 For a discussion of the judgment-proof problem, see generally Lynn M. LoPucki, 
The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure 
of Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REV. 147 (1998); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Judgment 
Proofing, Bankruptcy Policy, and the Dark Side of Tort Liability, 52 STAN. L. REV. 73 
(1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (1999); Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 
(1986).  
 195 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 921 (9th ed. 2009) (defining judgment-proof as 
“unable to satisfy a judgment for money damages because the person has no property, [or] 
does not own enough property within the court’s jurisdiction to satisfy the judgment”). 
 196 SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 230–31. 
 197 This scenario may be common because individuals have opportunities to protect their 
assets from liability. See LoPucki, The Death of Liability, supra note 194, at 14–38 
(describing various strategies individuals use to protect assets against liability). But see 
Schwarcz, supra note 194, at 1 (“[A]n economic analysis of these transactions suggests that 
widespread use of these judgment proofing techniques is unlikely.”). 
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too low). Moreover, the rule fails to take into account the effects of risk 
aversion, moral hazard, and judgment-proof injurers. 
D. Misalignment of Victims’ Incentives 
The discussion above assumes that accidents are unilateral in nature; in 
reality, most accidents are bilateral, meaning that both injurers and victims can 
take actions to reduce risk.198 In addition to the eggshell plaintiff rule’s creation 
of sub-optimal incentives for injurers, the rule has a socially undesirable effect 
on the behavior of victims as well—it dulls or may even eliminate eggshell 
victims’ incentive to take care and self-protect against losses. For purposes of 
this Article, victims can be separated into two categories: those who know of (or 
reasonably should be expected to discover) their eggshell condition; and those 
who do not know of (and reasonably should not be expected to discover) their 
eggshell condition.199 
As for the first category, we begin by analyzing those eggshell plaintiffs 
who know of (or could discover) their eggshell condition and who can also self-
protect (by warning the injurer, wearing a helmet, ceasing to engage in a 
particular activity, etc.).200 In these situations, the eggshell plaintiff rule fails to 
incentivize efforts to discover and self-protect against eggshell conditions, and 
actually perversely encourages the opposite result. 
To illustrate why, we revisit our dog-bite example.201 Assume that the cost 
for victims to discover whether they are particularly vulnerable to bites is 
minimal—in other words, dog-bite victims either know or could easily discern 
whether they are among the 90% of victims who would sustain “normal” 
damages of $100 from a bite, or the 10% of vulnerable victims who would 
suffer $10,000 in damages from a bite.202 Also assume that the dog owner will 
                                                                                                                       
 198 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 183; Jennifer H. Arlen, Reconsidering Efficient Tort 
Rules for Personal Injury: The Case of Single Activity Accidents, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
41, 46 (1990); Ram Singh, ‘Causation-Consistent’ Liability, Economic Efficiency and the 
Law of Torts, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 179, 181 (2007). 
 199 In reality, there could be a third group: victims who partially know about their 
eggshell condition (and for whom it is unreasonable to expect complete knowledge of the 
condition). We omit discussion of this group because the points made about victims with 
complete knowledge also would apply to some extent to victims with partial knowledge. 
 200 For more discussion on the role of self-protection by victims, see, for example, 
MARK F. GRADY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 90–95 (1994) (citing cases of victims’ 
self-protection as it relates to strict liability and negligence); Tomas J. Philipson & Richard 
A. Posner, The Economic Epidemiology of Crime, 39 J.L. & ECON. 405, 411–22 (1996) 
(discussing victims’ self-protection as it relates to criminal law). 
 201 See supra notes 118–22 and accompanying text. 
 202 Situations in which victims would reasonably be expected to know about their 
vulnerabilities are not uncommon. For example, many—perhaps even most—individuals 
know whether they are allergic to bee stings, peanut butter, penicillin, and many other 
common, everyday risks. Many individuals also know whether they have conditions that 
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exercise an optimal level of care (high care, costing $20) and an optimal level of 
activity (walking the dog once), which will minimize accident probability at 
5%.203 If the dog bite is a unilateral accident only under the control of the dog 
owner,204 the total expected social cost of each dog bite would be: 
 
$20 + (5% x (90% x $100 + 10% x $10,000)) = $74.50 
 
Suppose, however, that our dog-bite accident scenario is bilateral in nature, 
and victims with knowledge of their eggshell condition could reduce damages 
from a dog bite to a “normal” level of $100 by purchasing special anti-dog 
Kevlar pants for $200.205 If this were the case, the total expected social cost of 
each dog bite would change to206: 
 
$20 + (10% x $200) + (5% x (100% x $100)) = $45 
 
In this example, it is optimal for eggshell victims to buy Kevlar pants 
because it reduces the expected social cost of dog bites from $74.50 to $45.207 
This demonstrates that it is socially desirable for victims with relatively easy 
access to knowledge of their eggshell condition to self-protect, when doing so 
would reduce expected social costs.208 
And yet the eggshell plaintiff rule induces precisely the opposite result, at 
least in the context of strict liability: it removes the incentive for eggshell 
victims to discover their condition, self-protect against losses, and reduce social 
costs.209 When a strict-liability-plus-eggshell-plaintiff-rule regime applies, the 
                                                                                                                       
could aggravate accident damages, such as high blood pressure, alcoholism, a bad back, or a 
weak immune system. 
 203 See supra notes 119–26, 134–37 and accompanying text. 
 204 Meaning, in this context, that only the injurer can take action to reduce expected 
accident losses; the victim can do nothing. SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 178. 
 205 See Damien Stannard, Consumer Road Test—Kevlar Jeans, SUNDAY MAIL 
(Adelaide, Austl.), May 22, 2011, at 85 (“Let’s face it, who hasn’t needed Kevlar pants at 
some time in their past?”). 
 206 Because we assume that victims are aware of their vulnerabilities, we multiply the 
cost of the Kevlar pants ($200) by the percentage of victims that have an eggshell condition 
(10%) and thus would have a need for Kevlar pants. 
 207 Of course, it will not always be optimal for both injurers and victims to take care. 
SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 182–83. In the hypothetical above, for example, it would not be 
optimal for victims to take care if the Kevlar pants cost $1,000—if that were the case, the 
total expected social cost of each dog bite would be: $20 + (10% x $1,000) + (5% x (100% x 
$100)) = $125, which exceeds the social cost of $74.50 if victims take no care. 
 208 See id. at 182 (“The optimal levels of care of injurers and of victims will reflect their 
joint possibilities for reducing accident risks and their costs of care.”). Again, this situation 
assumes that the plaintiff is not ignorant of the law. See id. at 562–63.  
 209 Cf. POSNER, supra note 22, at 158–59 (describing, in the contract context, the 
incentive effects of allowing a victim of breach to recover the full consequences of the 
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victim knows she will be fully compensated for the full extent of her injuries, 
whether they were foreseeable or not, and whether she could have avoided them 
or not.210 Victims have no incentive to incur expenses ex ante that could reduce 
losses.211 
Note, however, that this effect on victims’ incentives is not as problematic 
if either negligence rules apply or if victims are reasonably ignorant of their 
eggshell condition.212 First, when negligence rules apply and those rules are 
properly administered by courts (meaning the “due care” standard is set 
optimally),213 the eggshell plaintiff rule likely has no positive or negative 
effects on victims’ behavior.214 Injurers will exercise due care to avoid 
liability,215 and the eggshell plaintiff rule will not apply.216 Instead, victims will 
bear the risk of accident losses under a properly functioning negligence rule, 
providing an incentive for them to discover their vulnerabilities, engage in 
optimal levels of care and activity, and self-protect.217 
Second, the eggshell plaintiff rule has no positive or negative effect on the 
other category of victims in eggshell cases: those who are reasonably ignorant 
of their vulnerable condition.218 In these circumstances, the presence or absence 
                                                                                                                       
breach despite the fact that such consequences were unforeseeable to the breacher of the 
contract). 
 210 See, e.g., DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 63, at 222 (noting that under the eggshell 
plaintiff rule, “the defendant does not escape liability for the unforeseeable personal 
reactions of the plaintiff”). 
 211 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 184 (noting that, in the context of strict liability, 
“victims will be fully compensated by injurers for accident losses” and “will not take care”). 
 212 This is similar to the effect of the eggshell plaintiff rule on injurers’ incentives, 
which is problematic in the context of strict liability but less problematic in the context of 
negligence. See supra notes 186–89 and accompanying text. 
 213 See Alan J. Meese, The Externality of Victim Care, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1201, 1210 
n.44 (2001) (“A negligence regime is ‘well-administered’ if, among other things, courts can 
accurately determine each party’s level of ‘due care’ and whether the injurer satisfied that 
standard.”). 
 214 SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 185–86. Additionally, a regime of strict liability with the 
defense of contributory negligence likely would preserve optimal incentives for victims to 
take care. See id. at 184–85. 
 215 Id. at 185–86 (“[I]f the courts choose due care to equal the socially optimal level, 
then injurers will be led to take due care.”). 
 216 See DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 63, at 222 (noting that the eggshell plaintiff rule 
does “not impose liability without fault”). 
 217 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 185–86, 202 (noting that victims exercise optimal 
levels of care and activity if negligence rules apply). Additionally, the assumption of risk 
doctrine disincentivizes victims from voluntarily assuming risk. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965). 
 218 For example, an eggshell plaintiff may have a latent condition that arises only when 
she is injured by a tortfeasor. See, e.g., Reed v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 185 F.3d 712, 714, 
716–17 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff with unknown, preexisting degenerative disk 
condition was entitled to a jury instruction on the eggshell plaintiff rule). Alternatively, 
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of eggshell liability has no bearing on victims’ ex ante behavior—a liability rule 
will not affect victims’ incentives to take care or self-protect if those victims are 
ignorant of their vulnerabilities.219  
Ultimately, however, the eggshell plaintiff rule has an overall negative 
effect on victims’ incentives. Although the rule is neutral when applied in the 
context of negligence liability or to reasonably ignorant eggshell victims, it has 
a negative impact when strict liability applies and victims know of or 
reasonably could discover their vulnerabilities.  
IV. A REVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO EGGSHELL LIABILITY 
From an economic standpoint, the eggshell plaintiff rule has the potential to 
create perverse behavioral incentives and thus be socially sub-optimal.220 To 
better align these incentives, we argue that courts should adopt foreseeability as 
the general rule for accidents involving vulnerable victims, bringing eggshell 
cases within the traditional rules governing foreseeability and proximate 
cause.221 We also argue that the goal of victim compensation can be 
accomplished through private or social insurance markets, instead of the tort 
system.222 Although the use of insurance to compensate eggshell victims gives 
rise to potential problems,223 solutions exist.224 Lastly, if victims continue to be 
compensated through the tort system (rather than through insurance markets), 
courts should apply a foreseeability rule not only in eggshell cases, but in “steel 
skull” cases as well.225 
A. Foreseeability as the General Rule 
As discussed above, injurers can only behave based on their expectations of 
the harm or benefit of their actions; liability for unforeseeable eggshell damages 
fails to incentivize optimal behavior in many cases.226 Injurers with imperfect 
                                                                                                                       
perhaps it is cost-prohibitive for the victim to discover her vulnerabilities, or prohibitively 
expensive for the victim to self-protect against losses. 
 219 Stated another way, a victim who does not know she has a thin skull and who cannot 
reasonably discover that condition will not care one way or another whether the eggshell 
plaintiff rule exists. 
 220 See supra Part III.C–D. 
 221 See infra Part IV.A. In other words, it is time for courts to dispense with the 
exceptional nature of eggshell cases. See, e.g., Bahr & Graham, supra note 13, at 418 (noting 
that the eggshell plaintiff rule “has remained virtually untouched in the past century while 
other basic notions of tort law have undergone significant alteration”). 
 222 See infra Part IV.B. 
 223 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 224 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 225 See infra Part IV.C. 
 226 See Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A 
Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 344 (2007) 
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knowledge of the probability and severity of eggshell injuries will misestimate 
expected damages, leading them to exercise sub-optimal care and activity 
levels.227 Risk aversion, moral hazard, and judgment-proof problems may 
misalign injurers’ incentives even further.228 And eggshell victims have little or 
no incentive to discover their vulnerabilities and self-protect under the current 
rule.229 
A rule holding injurers liable only for foreseeable damages substantially 
mitigates these problems, and is superior to the current rule, for several 
reasons.230 First, a foreseeability rule better aligns victims’ incentives by 
forcing victims to bear any accident losses that result from unforeseeable 
vulnerabilities.231 Eggshell victims would have an incentive to discover their 
vulnerabilities and self-protect in order to minimize these losses.232 
Second, although injurers would not internalize all the harm they cause 
under a foreseeability rule (which normally would be a sub-optimal result),233 
such a rule likely would not cause a significant deviation from optimal 
incentives among injurers. Eggshell plaintiffs are—by definition—extremely 
                                                                                                                       
(“If [injuries] are unforeseeable, then there is no reason to believe defendants will be able, 
correctly and cost-effectively, to determine what behaviors to engage in. The resulting risk is 
that they will either under- or overestimate the expected costs of these unforeseeable 
losses.”). 
 227 See supra notes 159–79 and accompanying text. 
 228 See supra notes 180–97 and accompanying text. 
 229 See supra notes 198–219 and accompanying text. 
 230 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW & ECONOMICS 644, 645 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (“Under 
the normative economic analysis, the proximate cause doctrine’s designated role is to 
expand or shrink the scope of liability, in order to achieve efficient deterrence.”). 
As an aside, one should be careful to note that while we have generalized the concept of 
foreseeability in this paper, it actually arises in three distinct places in traditional tort 
analysis. See W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 743–67 
(2005). First there is the question of whether or not an actor has a “duty” (where the concept 
of foreseeability is treated as a question of law for the judge to decide). Id. at 755–60. 
Second is the issue of “breach” (where whether the taking of a given action creates 
foreseeable harm so as to breach a duty of care). Id. at 744–47. Third, foreseeability arises 
when it comes to causation, where we refer to it as “proximate cause.” Id. at 747–50. Our 
analysis focuses on the concept of foreseeability in connection with respect to the extent of 
damages/harm created by negligent tortfeasors. 
 231 Cf. SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 202 (noting that, in the context of negligence liability, 
victims bear losses when injurers exercise reasonable care). 
 232 Victim incentives under our proposed foreseeability rule for eggshell cases would 
mirror the incentives under negligence rules generally, because negligence law imposes a 
foreseeability limitation on recovery. See Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the 
Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 111, 116 n.17 (1991) (“Under 
negligence, the injurer and the victim will exercise optimal precaution.”). 
 233 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 236–37 (noting that if damages fall short of actual 
harm, incentives to reduce risk will be inadequate, and if expected damages exceed harm, 
incentives to reduce risk will be too high).  
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few, making it likely that the cost of injurers’ misestimation of expected 
damages exceeds any eggshell harm prevented by the current eggshell plaintiff 
rule.234 Moreover, under a foreseeability rule, the number of eggshell victims 
would be even smaller because eggshell victims who can self-protect 
presumably would do so.235 
A simple example illustrates this point. Under the current rule, drivers are 
held liable for the full extent of damages caused by rear-end collisions236—an 
extremely common occurrence.237 And yet the cost of 211 million drivers238 
taking steps to reduce the risk of eggshell damages (e.g., installing extra 
bumpers on their cars) likely outweighs the cost of self-protection incurred by 
those eggshell victims who can self-protect, plus the harm caused to the few 
eggshell plaintiffs who cannot.239 
Third, a foreseeability rule for eggshell liability would ensure predictable 
limitations on accident damages, allowing risk-averse individuals to avoid 
bearing costs associated with uncertainty, and also enabling them to more 
accurately assess their insurance-purchasing needs.240 Under the eggshell 
plaintiff rule, risk-averse injurers face uncertain and unknown liability—there is 
no way they can know in advance which victims have thin skulls, and what the 
                                                                                                                       
 234 Cf. POSNER, supra note 22, at 232 (noting, in the context of product liability, that 
“product failures that cause serious personal injuries are extremely rare, and the cost to the 
consumer of becoming informed about them is apt to exceed the expected benefit”). 
 235 This is not to argue for a Darwinian, survival-of-the-fittest society. Rather, the point 
is that we live in a world of limited resources, and we cannot always prevent every harm. 
See Calandrillo, supra note 113, at 1028 (discussing the hard, yet necessary tradeoffs when 
rationing society’s limited resources). 
 236 Not surprisingly, cases discussing the eggshell plaintiff rule frequently involve rear-
end collisions. See, e.g., Rua v. Kirby, 8 A.3d 1123, 1124–26 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010); Guidry 
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 74 So.3d 1276, 1283–84 (La. Ct. App. 2011); Castillo v. 
Young, 720 N.W.2d 40, 42, 45–46 (Neb. 2006). 
 237 Rear-end collisions are the most common type of automobile accident—in the United 
States, more than 3.5 million rear-end collisions occurred in 2009 alone. NAT’L SAFETY 
COUNCIL, INJURY FACTS 106 (2011), available at http://www.nsc.org/Documents/Injury_ 
Facts/Injury_Facts_2011_w.pdf. 
 238 This is the number of licensed drivers in the United States. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 698 tbl.1114 (2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/trans.pdf. 
 239 Of course, where the injurer could avoid the harm for little or no cost, it is preferable 
to hold the injurer liable. Still, given the huge disparity between the number of potential 
injurers and the number of eggshell victims, it seems unlikely that this would be the case. 
 240 See Thomas R. Foley, Note, Insurers’ Misrepresentation Defense: The Need for a 
Knowledge Element, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 676 (1994) (noting that “insurance buyers 
prefer certainty and are risk-averse”); see also Michael Murray, Note, The Law of 
Describing Accidents: A New Proposal for Determining the Number of Occurrences in 
Insurance, 118 YALE L.J. 1484, 1491 (2009) (“Demand for insurance arises because 
individuals are risk averse with regard to losses: they prefer a certain loss to the risk of a 
greater loss even when the average loss is the same for both.”). 
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full extent of their injury will be.241 Under our proposed rule, however, liability 
is limited to foreseeable losses, making it easier for risk-averse injurers to avoid 
risk, as well as the pitfalls of excessive levels of care and diluted levels of 
activity.242  
Of course, “new rules for old problems may help bring on new 
problems,”243 and a foreseeability limitation on eggshell liability is no 
exception. Most notably, limiting liability for unforeseeable injuries may reduce 
injurers’ incentives to consider the full range of injuries that could result from 
their actions.244 In addition, awarding average damages to all eggshell plaintiffs 
may distort victims’ behavior (now risk-averse eggshell plaintiffs may be led to 
take excessive care, while steel skull plaintiffs may have less incentive to take 
care).245 Another difficulty in awarding only foreseeable rather than actual 
damages in every case is the measurement or calculation of such damages—
how will courts decide what qualifies as “normal” or “average” injuries 
stemming from particular actions by injurers?246  
None of these problems are new to courts, however. For instance, courts 
already limit damages “to the kind of harm” that is reasonably foreseeable,247 
even though they do not limit damages relating to the magnitude of that 
                                                                                                                       
 241 See Klimchuk, supra note 107, at 132 (noting that the eggshell plaintiff rule forces 
injurers to “absorb the costs of some unforeseeable injuries”); Jill Wieber Lens, Procedural 
Due Process and Predictable Punitive Damage Awards, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1, 40 (“The 
eggshell plaintiff rule famously mandates compensation for damages worsened due to a 
plaintiff’s preexisting condition, even though the extent of the injury is unforeseeable.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 242 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 235 (discussing foreseeability, and noting that 
“debilitating uncertainty” makes it difficult for injurers to take appropriate care and insure 
against losses). 
 243 Richard A. Epstein & M. Todd Henderson, Do Accounting Rules Matter? The 
Dangerous Allure of Mark to Market, 36 J. CORP. L. 513, 518 (2011). 
 244 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 239. 
 245 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 238. We also acknowledge the reality that eggshell 
victims may not know of their own preexisting conditions, and—even if they do—it may 
often be impractical or impossible to warn injurers in advance. For instance, how could an 
eggshell pedestrian let a driver know of her unusual condition immediately preceding a car 
accident? She likely could not, and one can imagine a variety of other situations where this 
is also true. In these circumstances, it would not be reasonable to expect ex ante 
communication between the parties or to expect that injurers could alter their care or activity 
levels to compensate for the greater risk their actions posed on potential victims. 
 246 Id. (arguing that an “average” damages approach would “create severe measurement 
problems”). 
 247 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (within the strict liability context); 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 
(2010) (limiting liability to the harms resulting from the “risks that made the actor’s conduct 
tortious”). 
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harm.248 As such, courts regularly decide the limits of foreseeable harm;249 all 
of the above critiques could be waged as general arguments against the modern 
tort system, independent of our proposed foreseeability limitation. Additionally, 
even if these criticisms have some merit, the benefits of limiting eggshell 
liability likely outweigh the costs.250 
B. Eggshell Insurance for Victims 
Victims still must be compensated for their losses.251 Given the wide 
availability of insurance, however, tort liability is not nearly as necessary for 
victim compensation as it was in years past.252 Further, the tort system is not a 
cost-effective mechanism for making victims whole—for every dollar 
compensated to victims through the tort system, the system generates more than 
a dollar in administrative costs.253 Thus, some kind of victim insurance likely 
would be a cost-effective alternative to the compensatory function served by the 
current eggshell plaintiff rule.254 
If courts adopt a foreseeability limitation on eggshell liability, private or 
public insurance markets could emerge to provide full compensation to eggshell 
                                                                                                                       
 248 DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 65, at 221; EMERGING ISSUES IN TORT LAW, supra note 
65, at 126; ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 65, at 180. 
 249 Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A 
History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 822 (1990) (noting that “courts commonly apply tests of 
foreseeability in negligence cases”). 
 250 Assuming that the number of eggshell plaintiffs is exceedingly small (which is 
almost certainly the case for most types of injuries), it is likely that any benefits from the 
existing eggshell plaintiff rule are vastly outweighed by the rule’s costs—namely, the 
misalignment of injurers’ and victims’ incentives in the vast majority of cases. 
 251 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 17 (2000) (“Compensation of injured 
persons is one of the generally accepted aims of tort law.”). 
 252 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 268–69. 
 253 These costs include lawyers’ fees, court fees, time, effort, emotional strain, and other 
legal and nonlegal investments in the tort litigation process. See id. at 280–81; see also 
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 17, at 57–58 (arguing that the tort system is “an exceedingly 
costly insurance mechanism” due to its high administrative costs); TILLINGHAST-TOWERS 
PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2003 UPDATE 17 (2003), available at https://www. 
towersperrin.com/tillinghast/publications/reports/2003_tort_costs_update/tort_costs_trends_
2003_update.pdf (noting that tort victims receive forty-six cents of each judgment or 
settlement dollar). 
 254 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 17, at 57 (“If people who want insurance and are 
willing to pay for it can obtain it in the insurance market or in some informal substitute, 
there is no apparent reason to use the tort system to provide insurance also.”); SHAVELL, 
supra note 22, at 268 (“[I]n the absence of the liability system, compensation of victims 
would probably be about as well accomplished through private and social accident insurance 
as it is today.”). 
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victims.255 Eggshell victims would bear risk associated with their own 
vulnerabilities; if victims are risk averse, they would seek “eggshell insurance” 
coverage against that risk.256 Theoretically, the insurance markets would be 
capable of providing victim compensation without incurring many of the 
disadvantages of the current eggshell plaintiff rule—namely, the imposition of 
excessive liability upon injurers and the distortion of behavioral incentives 
described above.257 
We explore the idea of using insurance markets to compensate eggshell 
victims by describing several potential problems of doing so (including moral 
hazard, adverse selection, and optimism bias).258 We then argue that these 
problems can be addressed by either mandating the purchase of private 
insurance or by providing social insurance for eggshell victims.259 
1. Potential Problems with Eggshell Insurance 
There are several potential problems associated with using insurance to 
compensate eggshell victims. First, the availability of insurance may produce a 
moral hazard effect.260 Ideally, the insurer can observe a victim’s level of care 
and can reduce premiums when victims self-protect in order to incentivize 
eggshell victims to take optimal care.261 In reality, however, insurers might 
                                                                                                                       
 255 See, e.g., INS. INFO. INST., http://www.iii.org (last visited July 21, 2012) (indicating 
that insurance is offered in a wide variety of contexts, including automobiles, disabilities, 
health, life, business, property, and natural disasters). 
 256 See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 184, at 669; Siegelman, supra note 184, at 1265. Of 
course, one could argue that injurers should be required to take out insurance for harm 
caused to eggshell plaintiffs rather than placing this burden on victims. Although this 
alternative approach might mitigate the problem of risk aversion among injurers, it would 
not encourage victims to self-protect. Placing the insurance burden on victims solves this 
problem. It also better coincides with the traditional corrective justice rationale underlying 
tort law because it avoids situations in which injurers would be forced to pay higher 
insurance premiums in order to compensate for unforeseeable harm.  
 257 See supra Part III.C.` 
 258 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 259 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 260 The following discussion mirrors the moral hazard effect described above in the 
context of injurers’ incentives under the existing eggshell plaintiff rule. See supra notes 190–
93 and accompanying text. Because a foreseeability rule would shift the risk of eggshell 
losses from injurers to victims (inducing victims to purchase insurance), the potential for 
moral hazard shifts to victims as well. 
 261 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 262–63. For example, if the insurer knew that a 
particular eggshell plaintiff took precautions such as wearing a helmet or alerting potential 
injurers to his fragile condition, the insurer could lower the premium to reflect the reduction 
in risk that would result. 
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have difficulty observing the level of care taken by eggshell victims,262 in 
which case they will not be able to lower premiums to reflect victims’ behavior, 
and victims will not have a pecuniary incentive to take care.263 
Second, adverse selection might occur.264 Adverse selection problems arise 
when the unhealthiest and riskiest segment of the market has a disproportionate 
incentive to insure.265 Victims aware of their eggshell condition would be more 
likely to buy insurance than “normal” victims with average vulnerabilities.266 
Normal victims’ foreseeable injuries would be fully compensated by the tort 
system under our proposed rule,267 reducing their need to enter into a secondary 
insurance market.268 Normal victims also would refrain from purchasing 
insurance due to the perception that they, with merely average risks, would be 
subsidizing eggshell victims with above-average risks.269 
If only eggshell victims purchase insurance, the insurer will raise the policy 
price to account for the fact that the insurance pool has a high degree of risk.270 
Premiums will skyrocket, and additional individuals will choose not to 
insure.271 As a result of both moral hazard and adverse selection, full coverage 
                                                                                                                       
 262 For example, insurers may not be able to observe how carefully a victim with 
eggshell vulnerabilities crosses the street, whether she wears a helmet on every occasion, or 
how diligently she informs injurers of her condition. 
 263 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 262–63. 
 264 For discussion on adverse selection, see generally JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC 
FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 329–33 (2011); George A. Akerlof, The Market for 
“Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); 
Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An 
Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976); Siegelman, 
supra note 184. 
 265 POSNER, supra note 22, at 137.  
 266 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Cleaning up the Environmental Liability Insurance Mess, 
27 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 608 (1993) (describing adverse selection as “the tendency of any 
potential policyholder posing an above-average risk to find insurance more attractive than a 
policyholder posing an average or below-average risk”). 
 267 See supra Part IV.A. 
 268 This reluctance to buy insurance would not be limited to normal victims with average 
vulnerabilities; conceivably, eggshell victims who are unaware of their vulnerabilities would 
wrongly assume that they run no risk of large losses and would be reluctant to insure as well. 
 269 Dana L. Kaersvang, Note, The Fair Housing Act and Disparate Impact in 
Homeowners Insurance, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1993, 2010 (2006) (“If risk levels were not 
similar among members of [an insurance] pool, those whose risk levels were less than 
average for the pool would drop out rather than subsidize higher-risk members.”). 
 270 POSNER, supra note 22, at 137.  
 271 Explained in more detail: 
When adverse selection occurs, the average expected cost of people in a plan is higher 
than the insurer planned. The insurer loses money. If the insurer then raises the 
premium, the higher premium causes relatively lower cost people to drop the policy, 
which pushes up the average cost of those remaining. The insurer loses money again 
and raises the premium again. Again, this forces lower cost people to drop out. This 
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could be prohibitively expensive, leading many eggshell victims to forgo 
insurance or to purchase only partial coverage against risk.272 
Finally, a related problem to adverse selection is the tendency for victims to 
systematically misperceive risk and underestimate the occurrence of low-
probability events.273 If potential eggshell victims suffer from optimism bias274 
and (wrongly) believe that they are unlikely to suffer extensive injuries due to 
the action of a tortfeasor, they would be less likely to purchase insurance 
against catastrophic injuries.275 If that is the case, eggshell victims could be 
forced to bear potentially ruinous costs. 
2. Solving Insurance Problems 
Fortunately, many of these problems can be ameliorated by mandating the 
purchase of private insurance, using methods that share risk with the insured, or 
by providing social insurance for eggshell victims. First, states could require 
                                                                                                                       
vicious cycle (sometimes called the “Premium Death Spiral”) continues until only the 
highest cost people are left in the policy. Most people have then dropped out and are 
uninsured. 
Adverse Selection and Cream Skimming, HEALTHINSURANCE.INFO, http://www. 
healthinsurance.info/HISEL.HTM (last visited Aug. 1, 2012); see also Loshin, supra note 
191, at 506 (discussing the consequences of adverse selection for both insureds and 
insurers). 
 272 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 263; Kenneth S. Reinker & David Rosenberg, 
Unlimited Subrogation: Improving Medical Malpractice Liability by Allowing Insurers to 
Take Charge, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. S261, S283 n.23 (2007). Under this scenario, eggshell 
victims will be exposed to some risk and will have some incentive to take care to avoid 
losses not covered by their insurance policies. See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 263. 
Precautions will not always be optimal under policies with partial coverage, however. Id. 
 273 See VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 175, at 661–63 (arguing that public misperception of 
risk generates irrational market decisions); see also Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of 
Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 602–03 (1986) (discussing, in the takings context, 
the potential for insurance markets to fail where potential victims face low probability risks 
and may therefore underestimate the probability of such risks). 
 274 “Optimism bias refers to the propensity of individuals to consistently underestimate 
personal risk in the decision-making context.” Amy B. Monahan, Federalism, Federal 
Regulation, or Free Market? An Examination of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1382. Such bias is most likely to occur when individuals perceive a 
hazard as having a low probability, and when they have had little personal experience with 
the risk. Id. at 1382–83. Optimism bias can result in sub-optimal levels of insurance. Id. 
 275 See id. at 1382–83 (describing the effects of optimism bias on insurance purchases); 
see also Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Tontines for the Invincibles: Enticing Low Risks 
into the Health-Insurance Pool with an Idea from Insurance History and Behavioral 
Economics, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 79, 95–97 (noting that optimism bias may contribute to 
underinsurance among young individuals). 
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purchase of eggshell insurance by all citizens.276 Mandating such coverage 
would ensure full compensation for eggshell victims, while protecting against 
adverse selection277 and optimism bias.278 Insurance mandates are 
commonplace. For example, the vast majority of states require drivers to 
purchase automobile liability insurance.279 Similarly, states generally require 
employers and employees to participate in workers compensation, regardless of 
whether the parties would have voluntarily negotiated for it on their own.280 
And most recently, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires that 
all Americans have health insurance or face a tax “penalty” instead.281 These 
mandates reflect society’s judgment that the sharing of extraordinary risks is 
preferable to exposing a few individuals to potentially catastrophic losses.282 
We submit that eggshell injuries are no different.283 
                                                                                                                       
 276 Along the same lines as our proposal for eggshell insurance, commentators have 
devoted much attention in recent years to the prospect of an individual mandate for health 
insurance. See, e.g., LINDA J. BLUMBERG & JOHN HOLAHAN, URBAN INST., DO INDIVIDUAL 
MANDATES MATTER? 1–3 (2008), available at www.urban.org/publications/411603.html; 
Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United States, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 571, 
601 (2008); Jonathan Cohn, Mandate Overboard, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 7, 2007, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.tnr.com/article/ politics/mandate-overboard. 
 277 See Russell Korobkin, Determining Health Care Rights from Behind a Veil of 
Ignorance, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 801, 826 (arguing that “the obvious response” to adverse 
selection “is to mandate participation, just as many states mandate that drivers maintain 
automobile insurance”); see also Norman Daniels, The Ethics of Health Reform: Why We 
Should Care About Who Is Missing Coverage, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1057, 1066–67 (2012). 
 278 See Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal Progress, 
13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 226 (2003) (suggesting that compulsory disaster 
insurance may be a potential solution to optimism bias in the context of house construction 
in disaster-prone areas). 
 279 Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 
(2008) (“Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia require automobile liability 
insurance covering bodily injury and property damage in specified amounts.”). 
 280 See Anthony J. Barkume & John W. Ruser, Deregulating Property-Casualty 
Insurance Pricing: The Case of Workers’ Compensation, 44 J.L. & ECON. 37, 43 (2001). 
 281 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). The Supreme Court 
upheld the major provisions of the Act in the summer of 2012 in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 282 Jeffrey M. Gaba, Taking “Justice and Fairness” Seriously: Distributive Justice and 
the Takings Clause, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 569, 586 (2007) (“Insurance involves the sharing 
of risk with others to minimize loss, but, in most economic views, insurance is appropriately 
employed only to avoid catastrophic loss from unusual and unpredictable events.”). 
 283 It is worth noting that a mandate for private eggshell insurance at the state level 
would not incur the type of constitutional challenges recently faced by the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, a federal law. See Dan T. Coenen, Originalism and the 
“Individual Mandate”: Rounding Out the Government’s Case for Constitutionality, 107 NW. 
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 55, 62 (2012), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/ 
colloquy/2012/10/ (noting that the parties challenging President Obama’s health care law 
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Second, insurers can employ specific methods to reduce both moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems in the absence of a mandate.284 Insurers can use 
deductibles, coverage limits and exclusions, and co-insurance to share risk with 
the insured.285 They also can use other strategies, such as excluding coverage of 
losses that the insured could easily prevent and, to the extent that the insurer has 
information about the risk levels of insureds, charging different prices to 
insureds based on their levels of risk.286 
Finally, if mandating private insurance fails to solve some of the problems 
described above, policymakers could consider the option of state-based social 
insurance.287 Political aversion to the concept aside,288 government could step 
in to reimburse eggshell victims for their extraordinary losses, rather than 
allowing the tort system to impose exorbitant damages on unsuspecting 
tortfeasors in lottery-like fashion.289 
Social insurance for eggshell victims would be comparable to today’s 
government-run welfare, unemployment, food-assistance, and disability 
insurance systems.290 Under a social insurance scheme, general taxes would 
fund victim compensation, and thus all of society would share the burden of 
                                                                                                                       
“do not argue that the states somehow lack authority to enact individual health insurance 
‘mandates’ pursuant to their general police powers”). 
 284 POSNER, supra note 22, at 136–37. 
 285 See Loshin, supra note 191, at 506–07 (discussing various methods used by insurers 
to combat the moral hazard and adverse selection problems created by insurance). 
 286 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 136–37. 
 287 For a general discussion on social insurance, see, for example, GEORGE E. REJDA, 
SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ECONOMIC SECURITY (7th ed. 2012); W.G. Friedmann, Social 
Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability, 63 HARV. L. REV. 241 (1949). 
 288 See, e.g., Dalia Sussman, Poll: 47 Percent Disapprove of Health Care Law, N.Y. 
TIMES: THE CAUCUS BLOG (Mar. 26, 2012, 7:39 AM), 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/poll-47-disapprove-of-health-care-law. But 
see Kevin Sack & Marjorie Connelly, In Poll, Wide Support for Government-Run Health, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/21/health/policy/ 
21poll.html?r=1. American skepticism about state-based insurance is not new. More than a 
century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes asserted that “[s]tate interference is an evil,” and 
argued that “[u]niversal insurance, if desired, can be better and more cheaply accomplished 
by private enterprise.” O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 96 (1881). 
 289 Unlike premium-funded private insurance, tax dollars would fund social insurance 
for eggshell victims. See Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety 
Net: The Alternative Minimum Tax as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
187, 193 (2010) (“In the social insurance context, the government body taxes individuals in 
relatively good financial condition to provide transfers to individuals who have suffered 
some economic loss.”). 
 290 For background on these social insurance programs, see Welfare, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/welfare (last visited Aug. 1, 2012). 
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reimbursing vulnerable victims.291 This would accomplish the compensation 
function previously served by tort law’s eggshell plaintiff rule, but without the 
accompanying distortionary impact on injurers’ and victims’ behavioral 
incentives.292 
Social insurance also can resolve the moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems described above. The government can use methods similar to those 
used by private insurers to incentivize optimal care and avoid moral hazard 
issues—namely, methods that ensure that the beneficiaries of social insurance 
internalize some of the social costs of their decisions and actions.293 Indeed, 
Judge Posner points out that “[g]overnment has powers that a private insurance 
company lacks that can alleviate these problems,” such as the ability to 
incentivize optimal behavior through the tax code.294 Further, adverse selection 
would not be an issue “because no one is permitted to withdraw from the 
insurance pool.”295  
In sum, private insurance markets could arise in response to a reformulated 
eggshell plaintiff rule to solve the problem of providing compensation to 
unfortunate victims in our society. Of course, the solution comes with some 
drawbacks, including the potential for moral hazard, adverse selection, and 
optimism bias. However, these problems can be substantially mitigated by 
mandating insurance coverage and by allowing insurers to use certain incentives 
to calibrate risk and to induce optimal behavior on the part of insureds. Finally, 
in the event that private insurance is not a viable option, society could choose to 
adopt a social insurance program in order to ensure that eggshell victims receive 
full compensation for their injuries. 
C. The Steel Skull Corollary: Foreseeable Damages in All Cases 
Given the likelihood of political opposition to state-run social insurance and 
even mandated private insurance, courts should consider other solutions as 
well.296 One potential alternative is for the tort system to use damages in “steel 
                                                                                                                       
 291 Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift from Individual to Group 
Responsibility in the Law of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1473, 1505 n.106 
(1986). 
 292 See id. (“For those concerned above all else with compensating victims, the most 
effective measure to ensure compensation is social insurance.”). 
 293 See, e.g., Walter Nicholson, The Evolution of Unemployment Insurance in the United 
States, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 123, 129 (2008); Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the 
Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 787 (1989). 
 294 POSNER, supra note 22, at 641. 
 295 Id. The insurance pool would therefore be representative of all levels of risk in 
society and would not shrink to the point where it contains only high-risk individuals. 
 296 It is not our intention to weigh every possible advantage or disadvantage of our 
proposed foreseeability limitation on eggshell liability in this Article. Certainly, there are 
dozens of other advantages and disadvantages—beyond those mentioned here—that courts 
and policymakers could consider. By weighing the primary advantages and disadvantages of 
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skull” cases to cross-subsidize eggshell victims.297 Steel skull individuals are 
those victims who suffer relatively minor injuries compared to the average 
victim (due to exceptional bone strength, resilience, and so forth).298 Under the 
current eggshell plaintiff rule, courts hold the injurer liable for actual damages, 
even though he reasonably should have expected to pay far more.299 
If courts were to adopt a foreseeability limitation on eggshell liability, they 
should hold injurers liable for reasonably foreseeable damages in all cases, 
regardless of whether victims have eggshell skulls or steel skulls. In other 
words, courts should determine and award the amount of damages that a 
“normal” or “average” victim would have suffered, regardless of whether the 
actual victim in question has above-average or below-average vulnerabilities.300 
Courts could order defendants to deposit the excess damages that steel skull 
victims do not need in a special fund, which then could be used to compensate 
eggshell victims in other cases.301 
This foreseeability-plus-cross-subsidizing approach would be superior to 
the current eggshell approach for several reasons. First, it ties damages to 
foreseeability in all cases, avoiding costs associated with uncertainty (most 
notably, the tendency for risk-averse injurers to exercise socially excessive 
                                                                                                                       
a foreseeability rule, we hope to contribute significantly to existing literature on tort law and 
the eggshell plaintiff rule. We encourage others to contribute meaningfully to the debate by 
weighing additional advantages and disadvantages of our proposal. 
 297 Cross-subsidization (a common effect when insurance is offered at a uniform price) 
involves the use of low-risk individuals to subsidize high-risk individuals. See, e.g., Allison 
K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, and Health 
Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 26–30 (2010) (discussing the cross-subsidizing feature of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act). 
 298 See POSNER, supra note 22, at 238 (referring to “rock skull” cases in which “the 
victim has above-average resistance to damage”); see also ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 
65, at 162 (describing the steel skull victims as the “flip side” of eggshell victims, and noting 
that in both steel skull and eggshell skull cases, “the tortfeasor’s responsibility is measured 
by the actual consequences”). 
 299 ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 65, at 162. 
 300 A determination of the “normal” or “average” level of damages is not unlike the 
inquiries that judges and jurors make in other contexts. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, On 
Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and 
the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 822 (2001) (“For as long [as] there has been a tort of 
negligence, American courts have defined negligence as conduct in which a reasonable 
man . . . would not have engaged.”).  
 301 See Rick Swedloff, Uncompensated Torts, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 721, 754–58 (2012) 
(discussing victim compensation funds). The fact that damages are minimal in steel skull 
cases does not address the problem of incentivizing these plaintiffs to bring suit in the first 
place. Given that steel skull victims receive minimal damages under both the status quo and 
our proposal, what incentive do they have to bring suit? Incentives to bring suit may indeed 
be sub-optimal; to address this problem, the government may have to provide steel skull 
victims some incentive (e.g., a subsidy or percentage of the total damages) to encourage 
them to bring suit. See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 398 (discussing the ability of states to 
encourage socially desirable litigation). 
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levels of care or socially inadequate levels of activity when faced with the 
unknown extent of eggshell liability).302 Second, it requires tortfeasors to pay 
foreseeable (rather than actual) damages in cases with steel skull victims, 
preserving optimal incentives among injurers.303 Third, cross-subsidization of 
eggshell victims by steel skull victims ensures full compensation for all 
victims,304 while avoiding unnecessary windfalls for steel skull plaintiffs.305 
Of course, there are potential problems with this approach as well. First, it 
might be difficult to locate tortfeasors who struck steel skull plaintiffs, since 
injuries would be minor and plaintiffs may not report them.306 Others are 
skeptical about the ability of courts to accurately determine the “normal” scope 
of damages.307 Additionally, cross-subsidization of eggshell victims by steel 
skull victims would be optimal only if the surplus in damages from steel skull 
cases (less administrative costs) roughly equals the shortfall in damages in 
eggshell cases—which will not necessarily be the case.308 Perhaps most 
troubling, injurers likely would be required to pay “normal” damages into the 
special compensation fund even if the steel skull victim in a particular case 
suffered no damage at all.309 
                                                                                                                       
 302 See SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 260. 
 303 In contrast, under the current rule tortfeasors pay unusually low damages in steel 
skull cases, due to the resiliency of that category of victims. When that occurs, injurers do 
not internalize the full cost of behavior that is otherwise dangerous. 
 304 This fulfills one of the main purposes of tort law. See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 
106, at 1–2. Of course, the current eggshell plaintiff rule accomplishes this goal as well, 
albeit with significant disadvantages. See supra Part III.C. 
 305 See Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiff’s Windfall from Punitive Damage 
Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900, 1903 (1992) (noting that a windfall occurs when “the 
payment to the plaintiff . . . exceeds the amount necessary for full compensation”). 
 306 One should be careful to note, though, that this problem is also the case where a 
person attempts but fails to succeed at committing a serious crime. For example, if an actor 
shoots to kill an intended target but misses (or the target suffers no harm because he is 
wearing a bulletproof vest), society does not simply turn its head and allow the perpetrator to 
go free. Rather, the state seeks out such dangerous actors, charges them with attempted 
crimes, and sanctions them at a level far greater than the actual harm that the victim 
sustained. That makes perfect sense from an economic perspective, as dangerous actors need 
to be incentivized to take greater care; absolving them in the case of steel skull victims 
would prevent precisely that goal. 
 307 See, e.g., Aaron J. Wright, Note, Rendered Impracticable: Behavioral Economics 
and the Impracticability Doctrine, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183, 2206 (2005) (citing various 
factors that present problems for “rules that require ex post determinations of an event’s 
foreseeability”). 
 308 See William P. Kratzke, Tax Subsidies, Third-Party-Payments, and Cross-
Subsidization: America’s Distorted Health Care Markets, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 279, 294 
(2009) (arguing that attempts at cross-subsidization often are “expensive, function unevenly 
and chaotically, and fail to achieve the objectives their proponents desire”). 
 309 For example, suppose an injurer hits a steel skull victim with her car, but the victim 
suffers absolutely no harm. Under the foreseeability-for-all approach, the injurer would 
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Although these concerns may have merit to some extent, they are not 
unique to our proposal and should not keep courts from experimenting. First, a 
judicial assessment of the “normal” scope of damages is no more or less 
amorphous than assessments of due care, foreseeability, proximate cause, 
reasonableness, and other determinations already made by judges and juries in 
tort cases.310 Second, if damage awards in steel skull cases and eggshell cases 
do not average out, that would ironically undercut one of the main economic 
arguments for the eggshell plaintiff rule itself.311 Third, it is not uncommon for 
the law to impose punishment or liability for actions that are considered 
dangerous or wrongful, even if no actual harm occurs.312 
V. CONCLUSION 
An inherent tension underlies the debate over the eggshell plaintiff rule. On 
one hand, the rule guarantees that victims are fully compensated for their 
losses—an egalitarian concept rooted in society’s desire to make victims whole. 
On the other hand, the rule conflicts with the fundamental principle that legal 
liability should be limited to foreseeable harm—a notion essential to society’s 
perception of the fairness of our judicial system.  
An economic analysis of the eggshell plaintiff rule shows why courts 
should resolve the debate in favor of foreseeability. The rule creates perverse 
behavioral incentives for injurers and victims alike. Exposure to extraordinary 
losses often leads injurers to take sub-optimal levels of care and activity. And 
full compensation for extraordinary injuries dulls victims’ incentives to take 
care. 
                                                                                                                       
nonetheless be liable for the amount of damages that would have been suffered by a normal 
victim in those circumstances. 
 310 Joel Levin, Tort Wars, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 869, 878 (2004) (“Much of 
tort law rises or falls based on the use of vague concepts like reasonableness, due care, 
proximate cause, recklessness, intentionality, and foreseeability.”). 
 311 The most frequent justification offered by law-and-economics scholars for imposing 
full liability in eggshell plaintiff cases is that “there must be [full] liability in the eggshell 
skull case to balance nonliability in the ‘rock skull’ case.” POSNER, supra note 22, at 238; 
see also JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 17, at 423 (“In a sense, holding injurers liable for all 
of the harm suffered by unusually sensitive victims makes up for the benefits that some 
injurers get when their victims turn out to be unusually hardy.”); LANDES & POSNER, supra 
note 17, at 250 (describing the economic balancing justification for paying actual damages to 
eggshell plaintiffs). 
 312 See, e.g., Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 371, 372 (1835) (awarding 
nominal damages for trespass, even though no damage to the land occurred); 
Commonwealth v. Gruff, 822 A.2d 773, 780 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (finding defendant guilty 
of assault with a rifle, even though no harm occurred). Moreover, criminal law generally 
punishes “attempted” crimes that did not actually succeed because our society is concerned 
about deterring similar conduct that has potentially harmful social consequences. See, e.g., 
SHAVELL, supra note 22, at 556–59. 
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Courts should take bold action by embracing a foreseeability rule. After all, 
bold action is a hallmark of the common law of torts.313 Eggshell liability 
should be no exception. By adopting a foreseeability rule for eggshell cases, 
courts can take another significant step in the evolution of tort law, while 




                                                                                                                       
 313 See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440–44 (Cal. 
1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (suggesting that strict liability, rather than negligence, should 
apply in products liability cases); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99–101 
(N.Y. 1928) (establishing the negligence law concept of proximate cause). 
